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ABSTRACT 
China and the United States have taken different paths to arrive at their respective 
stage of technological development. The United States obtained leadership in 
technological innovation through its competitive bid to remain technologically superior to 
the Soviet Union during the Cold War.  China developed late, taking a leapfrog approach 
to play catch-up to the West.  This is now changing as Cold War priorities end and 
globalization provides incentives for off shoring of U.S. technology companies to China. 
The shift to rely more on Commercial-off-the-Shelf (COTS) for military technology 
means keeping the United States a leader in innovative, civilian technologies is a security 
issue complicating this economic interdependence. Since technological interdependence 
with China is a given, how can the United States compete with China economically, 
politically, and militarily in East Asia?  Export controls, that kept technology out of the 
hands of the Soviet Union during the Cold War, do not work in a global political 
economy where commercial competitiveness is so vital and technology rapidly innovates 
and has global availability.  A new comprehensive approach is needed to solve the 
inadequate dual-use technology export control structure.  This new approach is required 
to meet current and future U.S. security and economic demands.  
The United States should use Strategic Technological Collaborative Leadership 
(STCL) to lead the region in finding new technological solutions for the region’s 
environmental and energy demands. STCL would then lend itself to a Collaborative-
Engagement policy that would have political, security, economic, and social benefits for 
the United States and the entire East Asian region. The collaborative structure set up in 
the United States to support this policy will also provide a comprehensive means to 
ensure an efficient and effective technology control process.  This process would ensure 
critical dual-use technology innovations stay within the United States and thus preserve 
the U.S. innovative technology base while minimally affecting commercial trade with 
China.  These policy attributes will be especially important as nanotechnology, which is 
inherently interdisciplinary and collaborative, brings innovations with the promise of 
further enhancing this collaborative effort in a positive direction.  There is an opportunity 
 v
to find the maximum utility for this new technology through collaborative-engagement. If 
this opportunity is not taken, China and the United States, and the world for that matter, 
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 xiv
I. TECHNOLOGY, GLOBALIZATION, AND NATIONAL 
SECURITY 
Since the end of World War II, the United States has been a superpower of 
technological innovation, military dominance, and commercial trade. Much of this 
production power and technological innovation was a direct result of a nationally led 
military buildup necessitated by World War II and continued by the Cold War.1 The U.S. 
government funded several high technology research and development initiatives, such as 
the Manhattan Project, that would drive a worldwide technological revolution. Then, 
through incentives and lucrative but exclusive contracts, the U.S. government insured that 
U.S. production centers would manufacture a majority of the technologies needed by the 
military.2 The perceived threat associated with the Cold War created an efficient 
relationship between the U.S. military and these production centers or Military Industrial 
Complex (MIC). MIC production was prioritized by the requirements of the military for 
the best equipment and cost for mission accomplishment.3 However, benign innovations 
stemming from this production crossed over into the commercial sector creating a 
synergistic relationship between the two that enhanced the U.S. commercial economic 
position.4  
Conversely, when the Cold War ended, the threat that had provided the impetus 
for exclusive military production ended along with the competitive efficiency between 
the military and the MIC. The healthy relationship that kept military requirements a 
priority for the civilian sector now shifted to political priorities of achieving a peace 
dividend.5 As military spending flattened, the incentives that had driven exclusive MIC 
R&D and production reduced, leaving an excess military industrial capacity. To mitigate 
                                                 
1 Eugene Gholz and Harvey M. Sapolsky, “Restructuring the U.S. Defense Industry,” International 
Security, 24:3 (Winter 1999-2000): 5-7. 
2 Ibid., 7-9. 
3 Ibid., 16. 
4 Glenn R. Fong, Breaking New Ground or Breaking the Rules: Strategic Reorientation in U.S. 
Industrial Policy, International Security, 25:2 (2000). 
5 Gholz and Sapolsky, 17-22. 
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this inefficiency, a new policy in the early 1990s resulted in acquisition and Military 
Specification (MILSPEC) reform. The belief was to allow the free market to revitalize 
and bring efficiency to the MIC.6 The military shifted from a policy that provides 
incentives for custom produced military items to a policy that encourages buying items 
“commercial off-the-shelf” (COTS). As military-driven production centers consolidated, 
military COTS expanded to include computers, communication devices and component 
parts for the production of larger scale military hardware.7 
While this change in the acquisition of military goods was occurring, a revolution 
in the commercial marketplace was changing the face of world trade. Up to this point, the 
United States parlayed its technological advantage with a strict export control regime; 
this ensured technological innovation would not fall into enemy hands, particularly those 
of the Soviet Union.8 However, as the new COTS directive loosened government control 
over military goods, the Internet and satellite communications, primarily developed for 
military use, found their way to the free market. These technologies, combined with the 
power of the computer, allowed for the instant transfer of information across the globe, 
making barriers such as distance irrelevant, eventually allowing regional or national 
production centers to become global. Taking advantage of this, U.S. companies, looking 
for ways to reduce domestic production costs, began moving production sites to foreign 
countries, such as China, in order to exploit its cheap production and labor costs. In order 
to broaden their market share and compete with foreign entities, U.S. companies 
demanded that foreign export controls be relaxed.9 However, as sensitive and 
unauthorized technology information was inevitably passed to foreign workers in China, 
it was argued that export controls needed to be reinstated to maintain the secrecy and 
efficacy of U.S. military type dual-use technologies.10  Soon, globalization of trade and 
                                                 
6 Gholz and Sapolsky, 30. 
7 Ibid., 25-30. 
8 Arvind Parkhe, “U.S. National Security Export Controls: Implications for Global Competitiveness of 
U.S. High-Tech Firms,” Strategic Management Journal, 13:1 (January 1992): 47-66. 
9 Cox Report, U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns With the People’s Republic 
of China, Select Committee United States House of Representatives, 1999, Chapter 1. 
10 Ibid. 
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diffusion of ideas and information meant that the U.S. and China’s economies formed a 
symbiotic interdependent economic relationship further complicating security concerns 
and export control effectiveness.  
The interdependence of politics and economics in global trade forms a structure 
referenced in this thesis as the Global Political Economy (GPE).11 With global politics 
and economics bound in an interdependent structure, dealing with the GPE realistically is 
an essential factor for any successful U.S. foreign policy toward China.12 China has 
positioned itself to take advantage of globalization with its relative advantages in labor, 
and production costs, as well as a national strategy to exploit the global marketplace and 
modernize its military.13 Consequently, the United States must formulate a competitive 
national agenda recognizing the constraints imposed by the GPE in order to maintain a 
constructive political and economic policy with China. This is especially true now with 
China rising to become one of the strongest global competitors to the United States 
economically, politically, and militarily.  
Since innovative technology advances gained by China through the process of 
globalization is inevitable, this thesis will recommend a policy that would best meet the 
United States’ political, economic, and security interests in East Asia. It will also explore 
how the United States can maintain a global technological leadership position while 
mitigating China’s rise politically, economically, and militarily. This thesis argues that in 
order to accomplish this, a nationally led collaborative-engagement foreign and trade 
policy with China is required.  This policy would center on a new technology initiative 
using Strategic Technological Collaborative Leadership (STCL) that uses U.S. innovative 
knowledge for the greatest utility, rather than relying solely on inferior protectionist or 
strict laissez-faire policy measures. The collaborative technology structure set up in the 
United States will ensure technological innovations, processes, and knowledge that 
warrant controls to China are identified early, strategically communicated, and 
                                                 
11 Geoffrey R. D. Underhill, “State, Market, and Global Political Economy: Genealogy of an (Inter-?) 
Discipline,” International Affairs, 76:4 (2000): 805-807. 
12 Ibid., 817, 818. 
13 Evan A. Feigenbaum, “Who’s behind China’s High-Technology ‘Revolution’?: How Bomb Makers 
Remade Beijing’s Priorities, Policies, and Institutions,” International Security, 24:1 (1999). 
 3
implemented effectively.  This collaborative structure will be implemented between the 
U.S. MIC and the civilian sector as well as between the United States, China, and the 
East Asian region.  The need for this collaborative technology policy will be examined in 
the failure of current export control policies beginning in the mid 1990s.  
As background to the importance that technological innovation plays in the 
process of globalization, the importance of leading in the innovative race, and security 
implications, it is useful to understand globalization’s basic dynamics.  Globalization is 
an evolving process through which humans, existing as separate social, political, and 
economic groups, adapt and take advantage of widespread-shared information and a 
shrinking globe brought about by technological innovation. Technology allows 
information to flow across continents in near real time. This information can be of 
various forms, from social, business, political to technology or religion. In this manner, 
the means of informational flow is dependent upon Information Technology (IT) to 
provide its end. IT fosters more efficient and effective ways to transmit, store, process 
data or usable information.14 One of the offshoots of this process is the spread, or 
diffusion, of technological innovation brought about by economic and social integration, 
cooperation, and collaboration.15 As multi-national enterprises with their associated 
capital flows and labor pools become global, technology diffusion is required to maintain 
optimal global transactional efficiency and market profitability.16 Technology diffusion is 
the spread of technology in the form of hardware, software and associated knowledge. 
“From this process, economic value becomes less tangible, more fluid, accessible, and 
portable across political boundaries.”17 The erosion of political boundaries results in the 
diffusion of the nation-state authority to, “multinational enterprises, worldwide 
                                                 
14 John Arquilla, “Patterns of Commercial Diffusion.” In The Diffusion of Military Technology and 
Ideas, ed. Emily O. Goldman and Leslie C. Eliason (Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 2003), 348. 
15 Emily O. Goldman and Andrew L. Ross, “The Diffusion of Military Technology and Ideas-Theory 
and Practice,” In The Diffusion of Military Technology and Ideas, ed. Emily O. Goldman and Leslie C. 
Eliason (Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 2003), 377-380. 
16 David C. Gompert, “Right Makes Might: Freedom and Power in the Information Age,” McNair 
Paper 59, (1998): 2. 
17 Ibid.  
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communications, and sundry nongovernmental actors.”18 A core benefit of globalization 
is a global market that takes advantage of globally traded countries’ relative advantages 
and efficient allocation of resources.19 These advantages allow a relatively higher quality 
of life by keeping goods and services relatively inexpensive; this of course, only applies 
for those who can take advantage of what this market has to offer. Therefore, with 
technological innovation the motive force behind globalization, it is logical that the 
country that leads with key innovation gains the upper hand in leading and controlling the 
global market. “The diffusion of technology does not sap but instead strengthens the 
enterprises and nations that invent and export it.”20  
However, a dichotomy arises between the process of globalization and national 
security; as globalization brings the world closer with diffusion of technological 
innovation, it likewise diminishes the authority of the individual state. Globalization and 
associated global enterprises provide a form of global governance for the international 
system of states centered on global economic growth.21 With increased social and 
political interaction as a natural progression of globalization and its associated complex 
interdependencies, power politics and associated security concerns seem out of place.  
The fact is that state governments are still in competition and worry about relative 
military capabilities with respect to national security. This duality brings about the need 
to satisfy both economic and military requirements with technology. It appears that the 
process of globalization and national security is a zero sum proposition. “These factors 
seem locked in a tight zero-sum embrace, as more attention to security considerations 
may have to supersede the pursuit of profits.”22  
 
                                                 
18 Gompert, 2. 
19 Stephen J. Flannagan, Ellen L. Frost, and Richard L. Kugler, Challenges of the Global Century: 
Report of the Project on Globalization and National Security (National Delaware University, Washington, 
D.C., 2001), 9. 
20 Gompert, 2. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Arquilla, 368. 
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The security implications inexorably linked to dual-use technology trade, those 
innovations traded that have both military and commercial applications, is a major focus 
of this thesis. “The ‘dual-use’ phenomenon is endemic to the technological realm; thus 
industry advances may often benefit both commerce and military capabilities.”23 This 
dual-use phenomenon is the microcosm of the larger argument about globalization and 
related complex interdependence and power politics and related security concerns. 
Globalization, it appears for China, keeps the dragon well fed and ready to do battle. “If 
Globalization diffuses then power politics concentrates, and even with the diffusion of 
economy and nation-states, it is still superior relative material capabilities that determine 
international conditions which can control the global market, and also decide war and 
peace.”24 To mitigate the risks associated with the apparent security trade off, in 
particular the transfer of militarily sensitive dual-use technology, states try to impose 
diffusion controls against states deemed a national security risk.25 These are commonly 
called export controls and come into conflict with economic free trade, open competition 
and the spirit of laissez-faire. It follows that a more conservative security policy approach 
on trade with China will improve national security but possibly have a negative affect on 
economics. Conversely, the opposite holds true with a more liberal approach embracing 
globalization and free trade but jeopardizing security. However, such dichotomous 
policies are antiquated in light of the globalization revolution and needs replacing with a 
collaborative technology policy that embraces economic interdependence, new 
collaborative technology controls, while at the same time protecting vital U.S. innovative 
strength.  
 
This thesis will analyze the different dynamics between China and the United 
States regarding military technological innovations and diffusion. The first section 
analyzes the historical paths China and the United States have taken concerning 
technological innovation and diffusion for both military and commercial requirements. 
                                                 
23 Arquilla, 351. 
24 Gompert, 2. 
25 Emily O. Goldman, “Receptivity to Revolution.” In The Diffusion of Military Technology and 
Ideas, ed. Emily O. Goldman and Leslie C. Eliason (Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 2003), 301. 
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The second section provides two case studies that will better understand the effectiveness 
of the current U.S. dual-use technology transfer controls with China and the associated 
commercial and military implications. The final section provides a policy analysis and 
policy recommendations that recognize that the United States must effectively compete to 
remain the innovative leader and maintain control over existing and new technologies 
through its leadership and influence in the collaborative process thereby ensuring both 
economic and national security.  
A. CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES: HISTORICAL CONTRASTS OF 
TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT 
The Cold War ushered in a continuous military technology race between the 
United States and the Soviet Union. Toward the end of the Cold War, China emerged 
from its early backward technological policies and capitalized on a more realistic policy 
approach that took advantage of capitalism and the open market.26 This new approach 
would seek to take advantage of existing technologies offered from its traditional 
ideological ally, Russia, and with new global economic trading partners, such as the 
United States, Japan, and European Union.27  Additionally, China’s economic growth 
rate is expanding its domestic market, and capitalizing on this market will become an 
important economic incentive for U.S. commercial technology innovation there.28  
1. U.S. Technology Development 
Following the end of the Second World War, the United States has been the 
leader in technological innovation. Much of the global innovative technologies today 
have roots in the United States and this era. From computers, software, and the Internet, 
the United States has pioneered much of the information revolution. This drive to 
innovate came mainly from the competitive nature fostered during the Second World War 
                                                 
26 Wayne M. Morrison, China’s Economic Condition, (CRS IB98014, 2006): 2. 
27 Adam Segal, “Practical Engagement: Drawing a Fine Line for U.S. – China Trade,” The 
Washington Quarterly 27:3 (2004): 161. 
28 Morrison, 1. 
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and the subsequent Cold War with the Soviet Union.29 To win this race, the United States 
government explicitly sponsored military technology initiatives designed to stay ahead of 
the Soviets, and by extension, enhancing its global security. “High levels of perceived 
security threat increased U.S. policymaker’s respect for military advice on weapons 
procurement and research and development (R&D) decisions.”30 The security priority 
created by the Cold War ensured relatively high federal R&D funding for existing and 
frontier technologies. Since the early 1960s, many key U.S. government technology 
initiatives have been introduced under a central agency named the Defense Advanced 
Projects Agency (DARPA) or ARPA as previously named.31 DARPA funds basic and 
exploratory technology R&D to industries and universities to meet this goal. There are 
currently over 80 technology research areas managed by DARPA.  
This agency has helped solidify the United States’ standing as the world’s leader 
in technological innovation. The main historical initiatives of DARPA include:  
• Sketchpad (1961-63), ARPA Network (ARPANET), 1967-75 
• Very High Speed Integrated Circuits (VHSIC), 1980-present 
• Strategic Computing Initiative (SCI), 1983-present 
• SEMATECH (1987-present), Advanced Lithography (AL), 1988-present 
• High Performance Computing and Communications (HPCC), 1992-
present 
• National Flat Panel Displays Initiative (NFPDI), 1994-present 
• Advanced Technology Program (ATP), 1994-present (managed by the 
Commerce Department) 
• National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI), 2000-present (managed by the 
Commerce Department)  
Of particular interest in the progression of these initiatives is how DARPA has 
reoriented its objectives starting from a strictly military mission to a more commercial 
                                                 
29 Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and William A. Own, “America’s Information Edge,” Foreign Affairs 75:2 
(1996): 20. 
30 Gholz and Sapolsky, 5. 
31 Fong, 153. 
 8
oriented development.32 This shift in focus correlates to an increase in global commercial 
competitiveness, the end of the Cold War and its implications, and increased U.S. 
military technology requirement reliance on Commercial-off-the-Shelf-Technology 
(COTS).  This progression shows that there have been past technology policies, or 
strategies, the United States used that worked well during the Cold War.  However, a new 
technology initiative needs implementing that focuses to address China’s rising 
competitiveness and U.S. economic and security needs.     
Two important DARPA initiatives throughout the 1960s and into early 1970 were 
Sketchpad and ARPANET. Military mission requirements were the main impetus behind 
these initiatives. During most of the Cold War, the United States faced limited global 
technological competition. Without the worry of commercial competitiveness, any 
commercial diffusion from these technology initiatives was unintentional or unplanned.  
In the early Cold War era, the U.S. Air Force needed a more modern way to interconnect 
its early warning radar system used to track Soviet bombers.  The Semi-automatic 
Ground Environment (SAGE) project, funded by the U.S. Air Force, with collaboration 
from MIT’s Lincoln Labs, developed computer technology to interconnect radar systems 
together, and provide a interactive display system.  It was on this computer technology 
that a new form of computer interactive graphics called Sketchpad and the ability to 
develop a “distributed redundant communications network that could withstand a nuclear 
first strike,” (ARPANET) were conceived.33  These two initiatives would be managed 
under DARPA.34   
These two programs would spawn unintended commercial spin-offs that would 
help propel the United States as the leader of the information age. Sketchpad’s 
commercial spin-offs include innovative computer graphics developed and used by 
                                                 
32 Fong, 160-165. 
33 Don Bissell, Graphical User Interface Gallery Guidebook, “The father of computer graphics”  
http://www.guidebookgallery.org/articles/thefatherofcomputergraphics (accessed December 2007); 
Lexikon, “History of Computing” http://www.computermuseum.li/Testpage/IBM-SAGE-computer.htm 
(accessed December 2007). 
34 Fong, 162, 163. 
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innovative leaders such as Silicon Graphics, Lucas Films, Pixar, and Adobe Systems.35 
ARPANET, with its distributed nodes located at universities and commercial contractors 
throughout the United States, fostered one of the most important commercial spin-offs, 
the Internet.36 Another unintentional spin-off stemming from the ARPANET was 
electronic mail or e-mail has become a mainstay in commercial, as well as military 
personal communications.37 These commercial spin-offs would be the genesis and 
foundational technology of globalization we know today.  
The commercial viability of ARPANET and Sketchpad fostered the first 
transitional development shift in the 1980s that hoped to realize the economic benefits of 
commercial spin-offs. However, even though VHSIC and SCI development had an 
intentional spin-off plan, this early dual-use development model still heavily favored 
military over commercial development.38 The VHSIC objectives were to develop 
advanced semi-conductor technologies required for military superiority. Circuit 
miniaturization and processing speed was the primary R&D focus.39 This led to many 
commercial spin-offs, “over 75 percent of VHSIC program will provide either direct or 
indirect fallout to the consumer marketplace.”40 Some notable commercial spin-offs 
include, Digital Signal Processing (DSP), used in digital motor controls, collision 
avoidance systems, and wireless computing and communication devices.41  
Another strategically implemented technology initiative that followed VHSIC was 
SCP. SCP was a $10 billion dollar undertaking and was DARPAs largest program thus 
far. This effort supported the development of IT technologies such as Very Large Scale 
Integrated (VLSI) microelectronics, computer parallel processing, and Artificial 
Intelligence (AI). From this, commercial innovations include; Computer vision systems, 
                                                 
35 Fong., 163-165. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid., 163-165. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid., 166. 
40 Ruth M. Davis, “The DOD Initiatives in Integrated Circuits,” IEEE Computer (July 1979): 79. 
41 Fong, 167. 
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speech recognition, and computer based problem solving. Military innovations include 
robotic vehicles, spoken alerts and natural language interface for flight systems, and the 
Naval Battle Management System (NBMS).42  
In the late 1980s and the early 1990s, a significant transition occurred in 
development planning at DARPA. The emphasis shifted to a more even development 
ratio between commercial and military innovative development. In some cases, the 
development planning favored commercial over military competitiveness. This shift was 
an explicit attempt to address the concern over U.S. global technological competitiveness, 
specifically with German and Japanese semi-conductor industries.43 In response to global 
competition, DARPA initiated the SEMATECH, AL, and HPCC projects. An interesting 
observation was the subsequent DOD acquisition and MILSPEC reform process 
following DARPA’s commercial reorientation. This is indicative of U.S. technological 
competitiveness becoming a priority to ensure continued military access to advanced 
technology within the U.S. commercial market, or spin-on technologies.44  
The SEMATECH initiative addressed growing concerns over U.S. defense firm’s 
dependence on foreign semi-conductor technologies.45 This initiative was in direct 
response to the erosion of U.S. and an increase in Japan’s semiconductor industry.46 
SEMATECH began with a consortium of U.S. firms to explore ways to ensure continued 
R&D, low cost and flexible production, and for sustained U.S. leadership in 
semiconductor technologies.47 The commercial consortium took priority over military 
objectives as emphasis shifted to ensure a stable U.S. technology industrial base that 
would provide long-term military access.48 With this strategic approach, SEMATECH  
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mirrored Japan’s Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) semiconductor 
initiatives that focused on Japan’s semiconductor competitiveness.49 It is interesting to 
note that SEMATECH was commercially funded after 1995.50 
In the 1970s, the Defense Department had a large demand for integrated circuits.  
This demand spurred new techniques for creating smaller circuit design.  Soon however, 
commercial demand would catch up and exceed military demand.51  From this demand 
another dual-use DARPA project was created called Advanced Lithography (AL). AL 
was instrumental in developing both commercial and military micron circuit design. 
Advanced lithography led to the creation of microcircuits on silicon chips, advancements 
in which produced significantly smaller circuit production.52    
This task builds on previous success and expertise in extending the 
performance of optical lithography toward deep sub-exposure wavelength 
features and pitches. The objectives of this task are to: (1) develop new 
concepts, which allow practical and cost-effective extensions of optical 
lithography to sub-35-nm half-pitch, (2) work with industry to 
commercialize those technologies to help U.S. industry retain leadership 
in deeply scaled CMOS technologies, and (3) understand fundamental 
limits of lithography.53 
The early 1990s brought the end of the Cold War and two more initiatives geared 
toward producing dual-use technologies. The HPC and the Flat panel display initiatives 
were undertaken for many of the continued commercial technological competitiveness 
concerns addressed in the SEMATECH and AL projects.54  
The HPC initiative was divided in two different research and development 
objectives.  One objective focused high performance computing toward the research into 
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gene research, digital anatomy, ocean modeling, ozone depletion, and planet imaging.55 
The other focused on electronic commerce, information infrastructure services, 
manufacturing process modeling, and semiconductor manufacturing.56  Even with a clear 
commercial orientation, 40 percent of funding still focused on military related 
objectives.57  
The National Flat Panel Display Initiative (NFPDI) was an extension of the 
SEMATECH program, “a model for federal consortia to advance other critical 
technologies.”58 With only four percent of the global flat panel market, the United States 
strategically needed this initiative to stay competitive and maintain military access. With 
national government leadership interested in strategic economic concerns and DOD 
military objectives, it created a formidable synergy. Examples of this are the advanced 
flat panel technology, such as liquid crystal, used in numerous military requirements such 
as modern jet aircraft cockpits and modern warships’ Combat Information Centers. 
Commercial industries include robotics, ceramics, electronic packaging, lithographic 
technologies, and electromechanical systems.59 At the executive level of the United 
States, the NFPDI represented the model in which to advance U.S. companies’ 
commercial global market position.  
Conversely, the national ATP and NNI programs operate outside the Department 
of Defense (DOD) jurisdiction managed by the Department of Commerce and the Nano 
Science and Technology Institute (NSTI), respectively. 
The ATP program spurs its partners to invest in research and development 
that have payoffs far beyond private profit, bringing to Americans higher 
paying jobs, better consumer products, improved health, greater 
efficiency, and a cleaner environment….ATP accelerates the development 
of new-to-the-world technologies by sharing the cost and the risk with 
companies when research risks are too high for the private sector to bear 
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alone….ATP catalyzes companies, universities, research organizations, 
and state and local entities to partner creatively to develop innovative 
technologies….ATP encourages companies to publish and share their 
results and to pursue patents and licensing to give others a chance to 
benefit from new knowledge created in ATP projects.60 
Unfortunately, the ATP program was cancelled in 2007. The “America Competes 
Act,” which focuses the United States efforts to be ready for the “gathering storm” 
approaching the United States, replaced it. Much of this program focuses on research, 
science and education.  Until this point, this was the only government-sponsored program 
developed for strictly commercial competitiveness.61  
However, a new frontier technology appeared with the potential to revolutionize 
technology. This new technology, called nanotechnology, is of such high importance that 
the U.S. government implemented a national commercial initiative to research it. The 
National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI) “provides a multi-agency framework to ensure 
U.S. leadership in nanotechnology that will be essential to improve human health, 
economic well being and national security. The NNI invests in fundamental research to 
further understanding of nanoscale phenomena and facilitate technology transfer.”62  
To understand the security and economic dynamics throughout these phases of 
technological initiatives, it is necessary to analyze the implications the end of the Cold 
War had on defense spending, R&D, and globalization. One problem for the United 
States after the Cold War military buildup was excess industrial production capacity left 
in the military industrial complex when it abruptly ended, “Many plants are too large to 
operate efficiently at post-Cold War production levels of demand.”63 This led to 
increasing costs for U.S. military hardware. Today this capacity overhang, which 
produces “legacy” systems, designed for the Cold War has been difficult to end. “Not one 
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Cold War weapons platform line has closed in the United States.”64 The United States, 
owning the largest share of the worlds GDP and R&D without USSR competition, felt it 
necessary to flatten its military budgets.  This budgetary position has resulted in lower 
procurement levels and relatively flat R&D levels throughout the 1990s.65  Additionally, 
U.S. industry contribution to the total U.S. R&D has dramatically overtaken DOD 
funding during the 1990s.66 (Figure 1).  This evidence supports the need for an expanded 
U.S. commercial technology policy led by government spending.  
 
U.S. National R&D Funding












































Figure 1.   U.S. National R&D Funding  
With defense firm over-capacity and a shift to a more commercial R&D funding 
trend, the DOD decided to reform its acquisition process to accommodate the open 
market and take advantage of more commercial technology. This reform intended to 
correlate military standards to its relative commercial standard equivalent.  
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During the Cold War, the formative period of the current export control 
regime, the military drove much technical research and provided funds for 
research and development. Now that situation is largely reversed. 
Shrinking defense budgets have reduced funds available for R&D. The 
military now purchases many items ‘off-the-shelf’ and relies to a greater 
extent on commercial applications.67 
The main target in this reform was to reduce the dependency on the military 
specification to satisfy military technology requirements. In 1994, the DOD initiated 
Military Specification (MILSPEC) reform. This reform was in essence a relaxation on 
custom military technological specification to include non-governmental (commercial) 
technological specification. MILSPEC reform had several objectives, including 
elimination of non-essential and military custom requirements and procedures, to take 
advantage of commercial technological innovation and processes, and facilitate defense 
firms’ commercial diversification, and to lower procurement costs.68 This would help 
meet the U.S. national security requirements by enhancing the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the transference of state of the art technologies from the U.S. commercial 
industrial base to spin-on military technologies.69  
With new performance standards, the DOD would rely more on commercial firms 
to figure out how best to use technology to meet the stated performance requirements.70 
Many specific technological examples provide proof positive of the extent of the non-
governmental and performance based standardization reform process. Today, much of the 
Navy’s newest Aegis weapon system is comprised of COTS technologies (see Table 1.). 
With this integration of commercial off-the-shelf technology into the Navy’s most 
advanced weapons systems, it is clear that maintaining U.S. commercial competitiveness 
and control of technology is of vital importance to the U.S military.  Additionally, the Air 
Forces’ Common Large Area Display Set (CLADS) is another example of COTS 
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technology used in their E-3 AWACS, E-8, C-130, and ground commands. This 
technology has reportedly saved 100 million dollars per year.71 Commercial technology 
allows Army soldiers and Marines to use wearable ruggedized field computers to increase 
situational awareness by connecting them to a network-centric battle-space.72  
 
COTS suppliers and components in the Aegis SPY-1D(V) radar 




3COM, Cabletron, Cisco, Interphase, PTI, 
RAMIX 
Network Technology Solutions 
Barco Video Display Systems 
Concurrent, Hewlett Packard, Sun 
Microsystems, Motorola 
Computing Equipment and Operating 
Environments 
Datum Time Processing 
Mountain Optech, Red Rock Tech., 
Seagate, Sony 
Storage Devices 
Lantronix, SBE Terminal Server Technologies 
Table 1.   COTS Suppliers and Components in the Aegis SPY-1D(V) Radar 
However, not all reform areas are working perfectly. The dynamic global 
technological market has significantly changed since the original premise of the reform 
process. The U.S. military is not the only global customer in the global technology 
market. One problem that has caused concern is in life-cycle support. With the U.S. 
military equipment relying on COTS equipment for vital systems, they are subordinate to 
global market’s innovative demand trends. If the global market no longer demands a 
specific technology used in military systems and no life-cycle support exists, the military 
must endure most of the re-design costs.73 Life cycle support is an ongoing issue being 
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worked out which requires much more commercially coordinated defense design 
planning. This demonstrates the volatility of innovative technologies on security 
requirements and the importance of maintaining a dominant controlling market position. 
While manufacturing costs have decreased due to the lower cost of commercial 
manufacturing, design, and R&D, the product line is still dependent upon the commercial 
global market.   
In order to sustain competitive cost reduction in technology development and 
production, many U.S. technology companies have off-shored production and even R&D 
abroad in such countries as China. In 2004, China was the third largest location for U.S. 
firm R&D in Asia behind Japan and Singapore (see Table 2). U.S. affiliates with majority 
ownership employ over 273,000 employees, and 71 percent of its production is sold to 
China’s growing domestic market.74 Some notable U.S. high technology companies 
involved to this extent include IBM, Intel, Lucent Technologies, Sun-Microsystems, and 
Advanced Micro Devices (AMD).75 Along with these companies come large 
investments; U.S. investment in China has increased substantially from 1994 to 2001. 
Several factors contribute to this trend: China’s low cost R&D, government support, low 
cost materials, and quality and quantity of science and engineering graduates.76  
 
U.S. R&D Investment in Asia 
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South Korea $246 
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U.S. R&D Investment in Asia 
2004  
Hong Kong $220 
India $163 
Philippines $44 
New Zealand $25 
Thailand $23 
Indonesia $4 
Total (world) $27,530 million 
Source: The Business Times 
Table 2.   U.S. R&D Investment in Asia 2004 
Another important area of U.S. technological development revolved around its 
level of control. The United States used export control regimes to ensure its technological 
innovations did not fall into the wrong hands. This control had an evolutionary path 
stemming from the Cold War and evolving with its demise and the growth of 
globalization. Strictly adhered to export control regimes during the Cold War kept 
technology diffusion or technology transfer from reaching U.S. enemies such as the 
Soviet Union and China.77 The main regime was the Coordinating Committee for 
Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) established in 1949 by the United States and its 
allies.78 The primary motivating factor for COCOM members was the fear of weapons 
related technologies falling into enemy hands, mainly from target states such as the 
Soviet Union and China, and returned as weapons used against them.79 Scholars argue 
that COCOM worked because it was a “collective response to a common threat or 
coercion by the dominant state.”80 The dominant state was the United States in the 
bipolar order created by the Cold War.81 Following the end of the Cold War, and 
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associated bipolar order, COCOM members agreed a new export control regime was 
needed to better promote global economic growth.  The United States felt it important for 
Russia and China to have the opportunity to transition to a market economy.82 So, in 
1994, COCOM was replaced with a more inclusive multilateral export control agreement 
reached in Wassenaar, Netherlands, known as Wassenaar.  This agreement promoted 
transparent individual state policies to prevent “destabilizing accumulations” of 
conventional and dual-use technologies.83  Wassenaar was ratified in 1996 after long 
export negotiations with member state Russia.84 Wassenaar was a much weaker control 
regime that relied on member countries’ honor system of sorts.  
Under Wassenaar rules, decisions are made at the national discretion and 
no veto exists in any case. WA also lacks the level of ongoing 
consultations that characterize COCOM…The emphasis of WA is on 
nonproliferation, transparency, and end-use assurances, rather than 
wholesale denial of technology and trade to Communist states.85 
Wassenaar provides a nondiscrimination membership, or conditionally open to 
member states. The only states formerly tagged as target states were Iran, Iraq, North 
Korea, and Libya.86  Wassenaar critics have argued that it only provides a forum for 
collecting data on particular technology transfers, and its weakness provides the impetus 
for the United States to institute unilateral export controls.87 However, others argue that 
the Wassenaar regime is a natural progression of states moving into a more globally 
interdependent structure where the cost of trade wars far exceeds the benefit of controls. 
Additionally, “the United States no longer has the sort of global economic and 
technological dominance it once commanded in the early decades of the Cold War.”88  
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However, the reason why the Cold War ended and the Soviet system collapsed is 
the diffusion of normative values favoring multilateralism, and Gorbachev identifying 
with the liberal West.89 With this, the Wassenaar regime, and other inclusive multilateral 
policies provide opportunities to increase social interaction, closer common identities, 
and normative values. Therefore, China should be included into this membership with the 
intention of creating a shared social intersubjective of how proper liberal states behave, 
and how they understand and solve problems.90 “Engaging the Chinese at an early stage 
of the regime development process lay a promising foundation for future compliance with 
international norms.”91 Moreover, if Wassenaar is ever to become the robust and 
effective regime envisioned by its members, it would need to be a collaborative problem 
solving effort rather than merely promoting transparent policies to help avoid an 
inevitable common threat.92 
2.  China’s Development Path  
China is now considered by many security minded professionals in the United 
States as the next great-power competitor with the United States.93 Central to the 
accuracy of this prediction will be China’s military technology modernization plan called 
the “863 program” that was put into effect in 1986 and China’s rising military budget to 
meet this end. After missing the technology boom advancing through the United States in 
the late 1960s and 70s, China’s technological base was roughly 15 years behind the 
United States by the 1980s.94 Chinese S&T processes were flawed and needed reforming. 
Although Chinese leadership had placed greater emphasis on S&T initiatives, in 1978 the 
military engineers realized they could not compete or keep pace with the dynamically 
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advancing global technology primarily controlled by the United States.95 With prolonged 
external stability, China focused on a domestic economic development national strategy. 
Faced with shrinking budgets, Chinese defense elites realized “given the growing 
interdependence between defense technology and commercial innovation, strategic 
leaders soon took the position that China’s national R&D system, not its defense-
technical systems, was the real issue at stake.”96  
Accordingly, there began a big push in China for a national R&D program that 
would satisfy both commercial and military needs. The 863 programs develop a state 
centric strategy for long-range leading edge technology development to foster both 
industrial competitiveness and military strength.97 “The program transitioned from a 
weapons systems era model of spin-off to a subtle, if more technical broad ranging, effort 
at commercial-to-military ‘spin-on’ technologies.”98 The implication of this was that 
Chinese defense planners knew that defense requirements were becoming a function of 
the commercial market and adapted their requirements to take advantage of the global 
market and technology transfers.  
There was strong emphasis on the 863 Program for acquiring the latest technology 
in order to modernize commercially and militarize China more effectively. “The 863 
effort reflects a continuing-and almost reflexive-fascination with the ‘latest’ technology 
that belies the huge gaps continuing to China's industrial base.”99 This is tantamount to 
the “leap frog” approach so often referred to as a key factor in China's technology catch 
up strategy with the West.  China is using a national strategic technology policy (863) 
and is not taking a laissez-faire approach.  The United States should implement its own 
strategic technology policy that takes full advantage of its innovative lead in existing and 
pioneering technologies.   
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The 863-technology development plan was not a linear evolution but one that 
took shape over two decades of policy experiment. This program coincided with or 
perhaps fostered the process of globalization with its associated Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) and Foreign Invested Enterprises (FIEs). The plan was initially limited 
as a techno-nationalist plan that selectively limited access to Multi-National Corporations 
(MNCs), and centered on State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and government sponsored 
research.100 China believed that these selective SOEs could cooperate with selective 
MNCs and would successfully diffuse technology domestically. However, an inefficient 
and ineffective bureaucratic structure coupled with limited entrepreneurial, technical, and 
global business experience kept China from realizing this goal.101  
Throughout the latter half of the 1980s and into the early 1990s, the 863 plan was 
of limited success due to this restrictive market philosophy. One area in China, the 
Guangdong province, however, was having great success with FDI. This province 
allowed a much more independent corporate operation allowing greater access to MNCs 
through Hong Kong. This access fostered a multi-national cooperative technological 
relationship that in turn, fostered a more global business experience.102 The success in 
Guangdong province provided the impetus for a more liberal 863 policy that relies on 
FDI and individual entrepreneurial experience.103  
In 1993, a decision allowed Non-Governmental Enterprises (NGEs) to play a key 
role in technological development in China. “Innovative systems based on market-
oriented technology forms as well as changing S&T systems dominated by public 
institutions to one that embraces organizations of various ownership structures.”104 This 
policy change increased global business cooperation that in turn increased FDI, as well as 
FIEs.  By 1997, MNCs became the primary source of technology imports into China.105 
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This new liberal policy increased high technology exports and opened up China’s huge 
domestic market to a globally interdependent technology trade. China would now 
recognize private domestic enterprises and FIEs as a vital component to its development 
strategy.106  
Implications stemming from political change after the Asian Financial Crisis of 
1997 cemented the end to policies that relied on SOEs and instead shifted toward 
encouraging start-up, small business, and venture capital. The Chinese government, for 
the first time, “fully acknowledged the legitimate contribution and equal rights of private 
enterprises.” China now considered these firms “national” assets or “national champions” 
as it did of SOEs previously.107 There was also a recognition of the innovative 
contribution disenfranchised Chinese scientists had made in the United States. These new 
policies were conceived to keep Chinese scientists from working abroad by creating 
incentives and supporting their innovative capacity. By 1999, the government’s ability to 
select specific technology imports had diminished. A new broader emphasis placed 
importance on encouraging the diffusion of knowledge through less tangible means such 
as consulting rather than hard-pressed “hardware” transfers.108  
With growing venture capital, entrepreneurial growth, and expanding private 
firms, the 863 policy shifted again to promote domestic technology development. The 
implementation of new incentives to foster the budding entrepreneurial spirit had begun. 
These incentives were specific in support of domestic high tech industries and services. 
Other implementations included many generous funds, tax deductions, and exceptions to 
encourage the transfer and or development of new technologies.109 Additionally, high 
technology companies had the opportunity to list on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock 
exchanges. These incentives combined with low cost labor and a large domestic market 
provided China with a significant comparative advantage that fosters the growth of 
domestic technology enterprise as well as multi-national technology corporations and 
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their associated foreign invested enterprises. Due to liberal policy reform, annual inward 
FDI increased from $11 billion in 1992 to $70 billion in 2005 (see Figure 2). In general, 
this FDI shows China’s growing interdependence with the West.   
Utilized FDI Inflow from 1984 to 2005
(US$ bn)






















Figure 2.   Utilized FDI Inflow from 1984-2005 
The Chinese Huawei firm provides examples of successful domestic enterprise 
during this time. The Huawei telecommunications equipment company started out taking 
advantage of the special economic zones that allowed collaboration and cooperation with 
foreign firms and capital. “Huawei is entirely Chinese and with national reach. In 1999 
revenue from this telecommunication switch maker reached U.S. $1.8 billion.”110 
Huawei is employee owned (joint stock), highly educated (80 percent with upper level 
degrees), and invests heavily in R&D (18 percent of revenue).111 It is just one example of 
the new independent entrepreneurial enterprises springing up in China and shows the 
potential for even more sophisticated domestic technology companies to emerge.  
However, Huawei has been known to steal technology secrets by disassembling, copying, 
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and reverse engineering equipment of competitors.  This was the case when Huawei 
settled complaints of such violations of copying from Cisco, a U.S. software company.112     
Another example is the Legend Company started in 1984 by a group of scientists 
from the Institute of Computer Technology (ICT) at the Chinese Academy of Science 
(CAS). It began by developing Chinese character conversion technologies for PCs used 
in China. By 1998, they were producing their own PCs sold in China’s domestic 
market.113 Legend’s modern organizational structure would become the model to emulate 
in China.114 Legend (now renamed Lenovo) diversified to include scientific research in 
networks, software, and microelectronics.115 From 1993 to 1997, Legend’s profits went 
from $500 million to $1.5 billion. In 2000, Legend became a joint-stock company with 
CAS as the largest stockholder.116  Today, China’s private high technology companies 
such as Legend, as well as others like Great Wall, and Langchao, all find their origins 
traced back to government 863 funded initiatives.117  Huawei and Legend represent just 
two Chinese owned companies taking advantage of China’s new more liberal technology 
development policies. Low operating costs, government incentives, and a plethora of 
inexpensive but highly qualified physicists and scientists factor favorably for domestic 
technology companies to continue to grow in China. Companies like these in China must 
be recognized as potential diffusers of Western technology that have the potential of 
becoming direct competitors in high technology innovation. As one high-ranking Chinese 
official from the Shanghai Science and Technology Bureau states, “Future conflicts may 
well be competition for the possession of knowledge. Now all the most valuable 
intellectual property is in the hands of the Americans.  That’s not right.”118  
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Additionally, the Chinese government takes direct action to support core 
technologies within the 863 program. This techno-nationalism is ongoing, “The state will 
support each year, through interest subsidies, a few technological restructuring projects 
by large or medium-sized state owned enterprises that are deemed to be profitable, of 
strategic significance and merit on scientific ground.”119 Thus, the techno-nationalist 
policy is still relevant and so equates the 863 plan to a hybrid policy that combines 
elements of both liberal market forces and state planning. Nevertheless, the government 
realizes that the only hope of staying in power is to maintain economic and technological 
development. This understanding makes successful market competition a very powerful 
policy-shaping tool in China.  
Chinese policy, while still attempting to shape market outcomes, is now to 
a significant extent itself shaped by market processes. The government did 
not choose competitors, but elected to support aggressive competitors once 
they emerged….The most successful parts of China’s technological 
development in recent years appears to be precisely the areas where 
innovative domestic firms are closely related to FIEs, but engage in 
complex relations of supply, cooperation and competition…This seems to 
have led to a rapid ‘indigenization’ of technological competencies…The 
shift in policy seems to recognize the successes that are being achieved by 
China’s more entrepreneurial domestic firms, and could position China 
well to take a larger share of the ongoing technological revolution.120  
With all of the economic synergy brought about by growing global enterprises 
based in China, security remains a concern. From the 1991 Gulf War, Kosovo Conflict, 
Taiwan Straights Crisis, and the EP3 accident, comes a great concern of U.S. military 
dominance. After the first Gulf War, China’s leaders proclaimed, “We should attach great 
importance to strengthening the army through technology, enhance research in defense-
related science . . . give priority to developing arms needed for defense under high-tech 
conditions, and lay stress on developing new types of weapons.”121 During the Taiwan 
                                                 
119 Naughton and Segal, 18. 
120 Ibid., 19, 20. 
121 Feigenbaum, 126. 
 27
crisis, China’s leadership linked a “sound base in technology and national defense to the 
success of mainland’s re-unification enterprises.”122  
China is also not without the ability to leverage its market capital as a means of 
providing economic disincentives as it did when it decided to buy Airbus rather than 
Boeing aircraft. This decision was likely to punish the United States for its policy 
supporting the status quo with regard to Taiwan’s status.123 The precarious position 
China still finds itself in by being dependent upon external technology continues to put 
pressure on China to ensure a higher degree of technological diffusion. With such 
technological independence, China is still vulnerable to outside influence over its foreign 
policy.  China’s leaders when championing domestic technological innovation and 
market dominance point this out.124  
China’s market size has security implications due to the leverage it can wield due 
to its economic advantage. As China’s domestic market continues to grow in size and 
purchasing power, it will also gain greater ability to shape global technologies. This 
would give China a distinct advantage in emerging technological market. The huge 
domestic market demand for specific technological innovations has the potential to set 
new global standards that equates to a competitive advantage.125 If China is able to 
dominate in strategic global trade, it could develop its own standard that could possibly 
position it to control pioneering technologies even as its domestic market continues to 
grow.126  This is more evidence the United States needs a strategic technology policy to 
keep these important standards within the borders of the United States. 
China has focused much effort in improving its ability to research and develop 
new technology, “China has surpassed both the United States and India in advanced 
                                                 
122 Willy Wo-Lap lam, “Jiang Boosts Defense Funding,” South China Morning Post, December 1, 
1999. 
123 Naughton and Segal, 20. 
124 Ibid., 21. 
125 Ibid., 21, 22. 
126 Ibid., 23. 
 28
engineering and technology degrees, as well as in conducting basic research.”127  This 
demonstrates China’s dedication to education, particularly in engineering.  However, 
even with China’s highly educated workforce, it has relied on technology transfers for 
much of its innovative technological developments. Such was the case when in the mid 
1990s China gained access to sensitive technology from the United States. The 
implications from this illegal technology transfer will be discussed further in the next 
chapter.  With so many FIEs allowing collaboration with foreign counter-parts, it is only 
a matter of time before the line is crossed and permanent diffusion of technological 
processes and knowledge allows continual innovation to takes place. This innovation of 
course then can be diffused militarily.  This is what the security minded in the United 
States fear from a rising China being able to use the very technology the United States 
helped develop against it in war or conflict. Nevertheless, the question is, what can the 
United States do, realistically, to mitigate this fear in an evolving global economy.   
B. CONCLUSION 
Technology plays a key role in process of globalization, economic 
competitiveness, and security.  It is only logical that it should play a key role in the 
foreign and trade policy with China.128  The two distinctly different technological 
development paths taken by the United States and China necessitate some important 
observations. While the United States’ trade policy has fostered maintaining its broad 
technological lead, China’s policy is one, which seeks to catch up or “leap frog” over the 
competition. China has used global trade, FDI, and its relative advantage of inexpensive 
but highly educated workforce in combination with an aggressive 863 plan to achieve this 
goal. This plan has brought much high technology investment from the United States. As 
this investment continues to grow, a technological trade synergy between the United 
States and China becomes apparent.  Moreover, U.S. MNCs benefit by being able to 
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research collaboratively, design, and produce relatively inexpensive innovative 
technologies which quickly sale on the global market. This profit also fosters more 
foreign investment in China. The U.S. and Chinese consumers also benefit with 
inexpensive innovative products. Another equally important aspect is the effect of 
globalization on maintaining U.S. market control with respect to providing U.S. military 
technological advancements in the era of COTS. The U.S. commercial sector must 
strategically position itself to remain the technological innovative leader. “The 
underlying IPE of US-China relations paint a picture of deepening levels of 
interconnectedness that, if viewed in terms of US structural power over ideas and 
institutions at the global level, benefit the stronger partner.”129  The United States 
maintains a dominant economic position in this synergistic economic relationship, 
“Another structural factor maintaining the US’s dominant position over China is 
attributable to the fact that China remains a developing country hugely reliant on the 
import of US technology and expertise.”130 The United States can ill afford economically 
to approach China in the same way it approached the Soviet Union during the Cold War. 
The Soviet Union was in economic isolation with most of the West and so the United 
States could afford to conduct economic warfare through the implementation of vigorous 
control regimes such as COCOM. This is not the case with China where the 
repercussions of such economic warfare seems would not only to be infeasible but 
economically self-defeating. There is a view that one factor that caused the Soviet Union 
to collapse and lose the Cold War was due to its economic system’s inability to adapt and 
compete in the global technological marketplace.131 Will the United States succumb to 
this same fate when technologically competing with China in the GPE?  
There is a need to carefully balance economic demands with export controls due 
to the vital linkages between U.S. - China economic interdependencies, and U.S. 
military’s dependency on commercial technological competitiveness for spin-on 
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technologies.132 It is plausible that the dependency on the United States for technical 
innovative development has provided beneficial influence over China. Access to U.S. 
technology comes by way of liberal market institutional norms and standards. Allowing 
China to join the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 was contingent upon it 
institutionalizing trade practices and opening its market.133 The world bet on reciprocity, 
measured compliance, and sanctioned retaliation to provide incentive for proper state 
behavior.  Therefore, while China has benefited from global trade access, it has fallen in 
line with U.S. trade standards and practices, which enhances U.S. GPE standing.134 
Positive state behavior is not limited to exposure to liberal trade norms and standards 
alone. Another equally important aspect is the product and engine of trade itself, 
technological innovation, which plays a role in shaping new ideas, understandings, and 
innovations. Technological innovation can enhance ideas, communications, problem 
solving, and understanding, all of which are vital components of a successful foreign 
policy apparatus.  
In order to find balance between economic and security concerns, the United 
States government should implement a new collaborative technology initiative with the 
same effort it had taken during the Cold War.  This new technology initiative would be 
focused to address the growing concerns over China’ rising economic and military 
competition with the United States.  China already takes advantage of an aggressive and 
progressive technology policy, thus the United States should as well.  This new initiative 
would incorporate a new collaborative approach to technology research and development 
as well as export controls.  Export control would be an integral part of the collaborative 
technology initiative, and overall collaborative-engagement policy, designed to ensure a 
strategic approach is used to control the export of sensitive dual-use technology.   
An important question with regard to this scenario, and the main research for this 
thesis, is to understand the current export controls and its weaknesses better.  From this, 
what type of export control mechanism or policy changes are needed if any?  The next 
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chapter will study two cases involving illegal technology transfers from the United States 
to China in the mid to late 1990s. By studying these two cases, made famous by the Cox 
Report that recommended stricter export control measures, the effectiveness of export 
controls to limit the technological development in China as well as maintaining U.S. 
technological competitiveness within the GPE structure will be determined.  In 1998, the 
U.S. Congress established the Cox Commission to investigate and report its findings on 
the unauthorized transfer of sensitive technology to China.  This investigation was driven 
by the concern that China was using U.S. technology to develop its nuclear weapons 
capability.135   
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II. CASE STUDIES: EFFECTIVENESS OF CURRRENT U.S. 
DUAL-USE TECHNOLOGY EXPORT CONTROL SYSTEM   
Well-known cases of militarily sensitive dual-use technology transfers from the 
United States to China occurred throughout the 1990s. There have been transfer 
violations in nuclear, encryption, precision machining, high performance computer 
(HPC), and satellite technologies. This thesis selected HPC and satellite technologies 
cases because they represent the full spectrum of dual-use technologies that diffuse more 
easily then more obvious military oriented technologies. While computers are in high 
commercial demand for many useful benign projects, they can also be used to help build 
weapons, design weapon delivery vehicles, and enhance tactical knowledge with 
advanced simulation software.  High performance computers are most likely going to be 
used by government agencies in support of its mission.  Satellite technology has a more 
narrow demand due to its limited commercial adaptability, architecture, and 
expandability.  Satellite technology also has benign utility such as commercial 
communication, and using satellite imagery of the earth to understand environmental 
affects of soil erosion, flooding better, etc.  This technology could also be used militarily 
to locate, track, communicate, and target potential enemy targets with the same basic type 
of imagery.  There is also a threat that satellite launch technologies will be used to 
develop military ballistic missile technologies.    
Commercial cost is a primary driver for how broad a technology will diffuse into 
society.136 On a scale ranging from the low end of primarily commercial to the high end 
of primarily military applicability, HPC represents the lower limit or a more benign dual-
use characteristic then does satellite technology, which lies at the upper limit. Therefore, 
these two technologies represent both ends of the dual-use technology spectrum that will 
be studied to better understand the effectiveness of current export controls. Usually the 
more benign a technology, the less it is controlled. Less benign technology gravitates to a 
more security centered export control policy.137 
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A. SATELLITE RELATED TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER STUDY 
Satellite technology transfer to China has long been a contentious economic and 
security dilemma.  All through the 1990s, the United States struggled to define satellites 
and associated technology adequately as “dual-use” or “munitions.”  The resultant policy 
would split the export control jurisdiction between the State Department and the 
Commerce Department.  The State Department would handle the stricter export controls 
on the less benign satellite technology deemed munitions, and the Commerce Department 
would control the exports of the more benign dual-use satellite technology.  This 
arrangement is neither effective nor efficient at facilitating U.S. commercial satellite 
competitiveness or satisfying security objectives.138 Additionally, the United States faces 
global competition from its Wassenaar trading partners, who all interpret satellite 
technology as dual-use and place no restrictions on their export to China.139  
Additionally, the Wassenaar agreement itself places no controls on satellite technology.  
These circumstances place a great burden on U.S. export control system that worked well 
against the single Cold War Soviet competitor. This case study will help determine 
weaknesses in satellite U.S. export controls.        
As part of its 863 plan, China made it a high priority to import dual-use 
technology for both commercial and military use.140 It was legal under the U.S. export 
control laws to export satellite dual-use technology and to take advantages of launch 
services in China. In the early 1990s, satellite export-control oversight was split between 
the Department of State and the Department of Commerce, which allowed easing of 
export controls on the more benign satellite technologies to help bolster global growth of 
U.S. commercial satellite sales and services.141 This easing of controls allowed U.S. 
satellite manufactures to go offshore to China to take advantage of its launch services and 
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lower operating cost.142  However, it also split security responsibilities and added risk to 
the export control process.  This inability to access the risk associated with certain 
technologies adequately will be a key factor that shows the inadequacy of the current 
export control structure.   
In 1996, a launch failure at one of China’s launch cites required technicians from 
the U.S. aerospace industry to help troubleshoot the problem with their Chinese 
counterparts and in the process, passed unauthorized sensitive launch rocket technical 
details. An encryption chip was also missing from the equipment as well. This was a 
clear violation of export control laws restricting the passing of encryption, rocket, or 
missile technical details to China.143 The rockets used for the satellite launches share 
many common features as a ballistic missile used for military attacks.144 The United 
States restricts this technology from China in hopes of keeping China from being able to 
develop and perfect ballistic missile technologies. Additionally, the United States prefers 
to limit such technology in hopes of limiting China’s technology advancements, which 
lowers the risk of a missile attack against Taiwan.145 The Commerce Department 
unwittingly approved the illegal transfer of technical data it believed was benign and 
within its jurisdiction. As a result of this violation, controlling the export of the entire   
spectrum of satellite technology became the responsibility of the conservative State 
Department once again.  This resulted in a dramatic reduction of exports of U.S. satellites 
in 1999 and, “diminished the cycle-time advantages the lean, agile US builders had 
achieved.”146  The U.S. satellite industry had invested heavily in new launchers, but was 
counting on using Chinese launch services until they recouped their investment and could 
get the U.S. launch services up and running.147  Even though the industry suffered 
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economically, it was a success for security minded policy makers and ensured that U.S. 
missile, satellite and its associated GPS signals remained securely under U.S. control. 
However, to determine long term economic and security success from this protectionist 
policy, further analysis is required.  This shows how ineffective the current export control 
structure is at determining both security risks as well as economic risks associated with 
controlling technology transfers to China.  With this set up there seems to be only a 
blanket policy that is neither efficient nor effective in serving U.S. security and economic 
needs.    
Foreign customers and long-standing allies within the European Union (EU) have 
questioned the reliability of U.S. technology availability. They tired of technology delays 
brought about by the inefficient and slow State Department technology licensing process. 
Consequently, many EU members collaborated to develop their own technological base 
upon which to rely.148 Moreover, other countries such as Canada have refused to do 
business with the United States satellite industry due to restrictive export controls.149 “By 
the year 2000 the U.S. share of the geosynchronous satellite market declined from 75 to 
45 percent.”150 The burdensome U.S. licensing requirements work to constrain rather 
than advance U.S. technological competitiveness in the global market.151  This shows 
that a more dynamic control mechanism is needed that does not disrupt U.S. commercial 
competitiveness.  
The effectiveness of the current export control system becomes more dubious 
when factoring new global satellite competition and the ramifications of current U.S. 
isolation in the satellite industry.  In March 2002, the European Council of Transport 
Ministers gave the go ahead to start the development of Galileo, a European Space 
Agency (ESA) developed system to rival U.S. GPS based systems. The U.S. Pentagon 
warned that it creates a potential national security issue due to overlapping frequencies in 
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the military frequency band. “The addition of any Galileo service in the same spectrum as 
the GPS M-code will significantly complicate our ability to ensure availability of critical 
U.S. military GPS services in a time of crisis or conflict, and at the same time assure that 
adversary forces are denied similar capabilities.”152 The United States insisted that a free 
and open market should determine which system users choose. One of the U.S. concerns 
was that the EU consortium (ESA) wanted a GPS system independent of the U.S. 
controlled system. “Europe has long wanted less restrictive U.S. policies regarding access 
to U.S. market, technology transfer, and third party sales of technology and products.”153 
U.S. security concerns centered on the fact that the Galileo project has military capability 
and operated under civilian control.154 This situation was further complicated when 
China entered under contract with the Galileo Joint Undertaking (GJU) in the 
development phase of the Galileo program. The National Remote Sensing Center of 
China (NRSCC) will be responsible for the implementation of this program in China. The 
ESA already has extensive collaboration with China’s development of its remote sensing 
satellite capabilities.155 A press release from GJU states China had signed three contracts 
in 2005 for Chinese aerospace industry involvement in the Galileo project.156 The United 
States, fearing a loss of market share, worked with the EU to establish a collaborative 
framework. It appears likely that the U.S. GPS system will remain viable through a 
collaborative agreement reached by the US and the EU over GPS use.157  This entire 
scenario is important because it shows that a strategic export control system that 
collaborates with allies to keep technology under U.S. control is critical.  If the United 
States had established a collaborative agreement with the EU early, it could have 
communicated and cooperated with the EU to work through their technology trade policy 
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differences.  This collaborative agreement then could have grown into a greater 
cooperation in keeping technology from being transferred to high-risk countries such as 
China.  Unfortunately, today, China’s launch service has been so busy providing launches 
for European satellite manufacturers that it drew complaints from the United States.158  
This shows the need for the United States to lead in a collaborative network with the EU, 
as well as other countries to ensure that U.S. technology remains available and 
technology controls are standardized under U.S. leadership.   
China, which has collaborated with the EU, is now building up its own indigenous 
satellite capability and future prospects are low for a continued foreign market there. 
While China moves toward collaboration, Canada and South Korea have shifted away 
from doing business with the United States satellite industry and toward the EU. Canada 
has made it clear it will not do business with the United States due to its restrictive export 
controls.159 In fact, from 1995 to 1999, while under Department of Commerce control, 
the U.S. market share was 68 percent. From 2000 to 2006, it shrank to 58 percent under 
the more restrictive State Department control, as the EU market rose from 19 to 28 
percent in this same period.160  This shows the importance of ensuring that whatever 
technology is controlled, it will need to have some sort of economic incentive to keep it 
economically viable.   
China’s aerospace industry has gained a knowledge base through its collaborative 
efforts with the ESA, and the potential to develop new satellite technological innovations 
with probable diffusion throughout its military industry as well. This is evident by 
China’s recent launch of a DF-31 ballistic missile test in 2006, which is capable of hitting 
some parts of mainland United States with a nuclear payload.161  This test, coupled with 
China’s recent successful launch of an Anti-Satellite Missile (ASAT) in 2006, provides 
clear evidence that current U.S. export controls will not keep China from advancing its 
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satellite and ballistic missile technology.162  The fallout from China’s tests of its ASAT 
and DF-31 program may result in the United States becoming even more restrictive in its 
global trade with China, and push for new technologies to skirt China’s ASAT program. 
This has the potential for starting a space arms race with China and increasing the 
potential for a security dilemma driving up regional fears. This fear increases the 
potential for miscalculation by both China and the United States as they both jockey for 
relative military superiority in space.163  
There is no doubt China is advancing its technology, the question is whether or 
not China would have advanced faster with full access to U.S. technology?  The answer 
is the U.S. can and must do better at preventing less benign satellite technology from 
diffusing into China’s military and at the same time preserving U.S innovative base.  It is 
clear China will use its technological development to build military technology designed 
to defeat the military technology of the United States, and so it is imperative to address 
the current export control weaknesses before pioneering technologies begin to evolve.   
There are three major weaknesses with the current satellite export-control system.  
One weakness is it is a U.S. unilateral undertaking.  There is no satellite control 
consensus within the multilateral Wassenaar agreement, which allows Wassenaar 
members to collaborate with China unabated while the U.S. satellite industry suffers 
economically. The U.S. and EU in particular need to find consensus and clearly 
differentiate and address controls of associated satellite technologies, such as launch 
vehicles, that are often uncontrolled. Another weakness is that there is no connection 
between developing effective export controls on specific technologies and buffering the 
economic cost and innovative entrepreneurial loss when implementing those controls.  
Lastly, and potentially the gravest, is that static political agencies such as the State or 
Commerce Department fail with efficiently and effectively controlling rapidly evolving 
and innovating satellite technology transfers to China. The current system makes satellite 
export controls an after thought and not strategically planned.  There is a need to have in 
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place a system that can adequately determine risk, and apply controls rapidly and 
effectively but at the same time maintain U.S. commercial economic and innovate 
competitiveness. Whether measuring success by limiting China’s ability to diffuse 
technology into its military or to keep the U.S. competitive, the current systems of U.S. 
export controls are inadequate.  
If the intent of U.S. export control policy on Satellite Technology is 
intended to keep China behind the state of the art, to keep U.S. firms 
ahead of the rest of the world, or to sustain U.S. industrial capabilities, 
these policies have failed. If anything, export controls have likely spurred 
foreign governments to develop their own industrial capabilities and avoid 
use of U.S. technology.164 
B. HIGH PERFORMANCE COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
CASE STUDY 
Another area of concern for the United States is the transfer of high performance 
computer technology to China. Even though this technology represents a more benign 
technology, in that it is more globally available, the United States fears China will exploit 
this technology and innovate it for military use. Examples of some types would be 
ballistic and cruise missile development as well as command, control, communications, 
computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems (C4ISR) 
technologies.165 As in the satellite case, the United States relies on an outdated export 
control system that relies on the State or Commerce Department to monitor and control 
rapidly evolving technologies.  New extremely powerful HPC innovations, such as 
cluster computing networks, means that no matter how the United States limits exports of 
individual machines to China, they will be configured or clustered to exceed those 
controls.  The United States made a controversial decision to relax export controls on 
these computer systems in 1996.166 This determination centered on the argument that it 
was not possible to affect export control over this type of technology worldwide, due to 
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its proclivity to quickly be innovative and diffuse.167 This argument concluded that 
controllability was mainly associated with market availability and demand.168 From this 
conclusion, export controls were relaxed but the Cox Report argued that this conclusion 
lacked adequate data on how suspect countries like China were using this technology. 
This was made more complicated by China’s refusal to allow verification of HPC 
intended use or location.169  
A current analysis on HPC uses in China will help determine the effectiveness of 
current HPC controls and will determine the validity of the argument about location and 
use. The current HPC export controls focuses on the computational level required to 
conduct certain military related processes. Data extrapolation determines where suspect 
countries risk factors fall within these computational levels, to help determine the 
appropriate computer computational level suitable for export to that country.170 The 
current system uses a three-tiered export control system structured according to the level 
of security risk posed by individual countries. The higher the tier a country falls, the 
better the performance of computer exported.  Tier one countries get the best 
performance whereas tier three the worst.171  
There is no adequate international control regime for HPC technology. The 
Wassenaar export control regime, which covered associated WMD items, does not have 
provisions for controlling high performance computers. Moreover, as a result, the number 
of tier one countries receiving the most powerful computers compared to the tier three 
countries such as China, is 15 to 3.172 The probability of re-export and diffusion of 
technology from a tier one country to a tier three country is probable with this ratio. This 
becomes more relevant when considering that Hong Kong with its close proximity and 
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special trade status has a higher tier level than that of China.173 The probability of 
uncontrolled diffusion increases under these circumstances.  This shows that there is a 
need to develop technology controls that are designed into innovations to ensure they are 
used only for intended purposes.   
It is important to frame this argument in context of the implications stemming 
from U.S. MNCs in China as well. International production and research centers that 
foster innovation and diffusion are relevant to this study’s analysis. U.S. companies, such 
as Intel, IBM, and Advanced Micro Devices (AMD), are all international collaborators in 
China. Intel and AMD have teamed up with China’s Department of Education to design 
one of the world’s most powerful computing grids.174 This is an innovated cluster-
computing network that performs at supercomputer speeds. With collaborative business 
dealings, China has been able to develop indigenous high performance computer systems 
of its own.  IBM selling production of its “Think Pad” to Chinese computer maker 
Lenovo evidences this.175  Moreover, China’s Academy of Sciences (CAS), who partly 
owns Lenova, has collaborated with them to produce a 256-node cluster system using 
new Itanium 2 processors.176  Should this close collaboration go on unchecked?  
Additionally in 2003, AMD and Chinese server developer Dawning co-developed the 
Dawning 4000A operating at 10 teraflops.  This makes the 4000A the world’s third most 
powerful computing system.177  It is imperative that there is a dynamic technology 
control structure that examines the risks associated with certain collaborative efforts and 
ensures technology controls are effective to either constrain the configuration or ensure 
these powerful computing clusters are used only for intended purposes.     
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IBM, with a long collaborative history with Chinese companies, teamed up with 
the Beijing Meteorological Bureau in 2007 to develop another 10-teraflop cluster 
computing system.178 To support the explosive growth of China’s IT industry and 
collaborative research, Sun Microsystems collaborating with China Standard Software 
Company, will co-develop China’s new Java desktop system to support this endeavor. 
This software will help support collaborative networks that tie together major university 
as well as government research facilities in China and the world.179 Intel, celebrating 20 
years of collaboration with China, has invested heavily in Chinese growth toward 
becoming a “knowledge nation” through collaborative efforts with the Ministry of 
Education.180  Software is a key element to actually implementing HPC innovations 
toward an effective end, so controlling certain software applications and programming 
should be an integral part of any export control plan.   
These HPC innovations in China are the direct result of the process with U.S. 
commercial technology firms. The global enterprise allows computing performance to 
circumvent U.S. export controls by way of the innovative process. China now possesses 
computer systems with enough power to develop technologies equal to any nation. 
Engineering these computer grids into a collaborative framework gives China a distinct 
advantage in researching and developing new technologies. Why are these collaborative 
networks not being pursued in the United States with the same vigor?  Perhaps controls 
of HPC interconnection knowledge, processes, hardware, and software should be 
implemented.  This is relevant since these powerful grid networks can be used effectively 
to develop military capabilities.  More incentive needs to be placed on collaborative 
networks within the United States and less in China.  Again, a need for a strategic 
technological collaborative policy that addresses controlling the processes and knowledge 
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used to set up complex networks in China.  At the same time, this policy should provide 
incentive for the same type of collaborative investment within the United States while 
maintaining U.S. commercial competitiveness.  
C. CONCLUSION 
Antiquated export controls will be ineffective in controlling sensitive satellite and 
HPC technologies without a strategic and dynamic technology control mechanism.  This 
structure should employ controls that cover processes, knowledge, and software rather 
than mere export of end units.  Additionally, these technologies are available globally, so 
the Wassenaar agreement should be strengthened to incorporate technology controls of 
HPC and satellite technology.  This agreement should go beyond just looking at the end 
product (hardware) exports and should focus on collaboratively controlling processes, 
and knowledge.     
One very important step in fixing the current export control situation is effectively 
determining technology export risk.  This requires a completely new approach in 
controlling technology.  Tasking a static agency, such as State and Commerce 
Departments to stay cognizant of rapidly evolving satellite technology and accurately 
assess the risk in the export of this technology is ineffective.  This system makes export 
control an afterthought and needs reforming.  Export controls need to be designed into 
technology just as quality controls are designed in.  Export controls then become strategic 
and part of the overall R&D environment that keeps up with the rapidly evolving 
technology, and can accurately assess the export risk as it innovates. Moreover, a 
collaborative approach to export controls ensures a common understanding regarding 
technological exports to China thus reducing miscommunications and mistakes.181  
The weaknesses discussed in the current export control system shows that it is 
inadequate to ensure U.S. technological superiority and security.  This policy is effective 
only if the United States maintains its lead in the technological innovative race. 
Ironically, if the United States fails to maintain the innovative lead then it is plausible that 
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China could control the export of certain technologies exported to the United States. A 
policy that relies on export controls, no matter the type, is not enough to ensure U.S. 
economic and security superiority with China.   
The satellite study reveals that China is collaborating with the European Space 
Agency to develop sophisticated satellite technologies. Moreover, the satellite case study 
showed it is unwise to assume the technological lead enjoyed by the United States will 
continue without vigilant market analysis and national planning. Early market indicators 
such as demand and prospective rivals need to be addressed and solutions found early so 
if policy adjustments need to be made, it can be done in a timely manner to head off a 
possible competitor. Additionally, China has tested a ballistic missile capable of hitting 
the mainland of the United States. With this information, it is conclusive that China’s 
intention to use these technologies should be a relevant factor in determining U.S. export 
control effectiveness. The U.S. has not adequately mitigated China’s use of technology 
for military purposes through its current export-control system.  
The HPC study shows that the hierarchical country scheme that mandates controls 
for high performance computers do not function well without an international control 
regime. With the higher end technology being distributed throughout most of the world, it 
is probable that re-exportation to a higher risk country will occur. Moreover, HPC 
industries such as Intel, IBM and AMD are already heavily invested and collaborating in 
China. It becomes clear that it is necessary for additional measures to be taken that go 
beyond just multilateral export controls to ensure against sensitive dual-use technology 
transfers to China.  
IBM, Intel, Sun-Microsystems, and AMD collaborating with China have 
circumvented controls by innovating high performance computing in supercomputer grid 
configurations.  The inherent problem with this unchecked collaboration is that there is 
no dynamic risk-analysis mechanism to determine if China will diffuse this technology 
for military use.  The fact is that China has already acquired computer systems, 
sophisticated missiles, and satellite technologies that can match the capability of most 
countries in the world. China’s technological advancement will continue to increase 
without an effective U.S. technology control system in place. With so many high tech 
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firms operating in China, innovation and diffusion make the current export controls to 
China counterproductive to keeping U.S. high technology innovations centered in the 
United States. These global companies have moved offshore to collaborate, and innovate 
with Chinese companies to avoid the ineffective and restrictive U.S. trade policies.  They 
take advantage of China’s comparative advantages in labor, operating costs, and growing 
domestic market.  The United States government needs to develop a collaborative 
strategic technology policy that effectively incorporates export controls into the R&D 
process so that it strengthens U.S. innovative entrepreneurialism (increased intellectual 
property rights), and raises technology security.182   
A dynamic risk analysis process and designed-in technology controls must be 
integrated early in the R&D process so that the end product can only be used as originally 
intended, that being benign innovative uses. By developing innovations that effectively 
controls technology-transfer is key.  This designed-in process, using black box 
technology or encrypted software, would only allow a specific connection arrangement or 
software function for innovations such as the grid-computing configuration. Any attempt 
to tamper with these configurations or reverse engineer it would result in the sensitive 
technology areas self-destructing.  Building these grids with this new type of technology 
controls allows technology transfer control while maintaining innovations to solve 
problems, and adds collaborative utility between the United States and China.  It also 
strengthens U.S. – China economic interdependence while preserving sensitive U.S. 
innovations.  Ultimately, U.S. commercial competitiveness and national security is of 
vital importance and so the need for this type of new technology control is warranted.  
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III. CONSTRUCTING COLLABORATIVE U.S.–CHINA TRADE 
RELATIONS 
The United States government should focus on incentives to encourage a strong 
collaborative research and development environment centered within the United States. 
With the collaborative hub centered in the United States, there is a better chance of 
controlling the direction of innovation of technologies rather than if China or another 
global competitor innovates autonomously. The U.S. military benefit of being the 
commercial innovative leader is a critical objective as well. This approach would require 
a more competitive approach that takes a less provocative path then reactionary export-
control implementation.183  The United States should instead design in export controls to 
reduce provocation while strengthening its innovative and economic position.  
Chinese technology production intention is a wildcard, which requires a new 
approach to mitigate less-benign technological innovations when export controls are 
ineffective due to globalization and diffusion. Globalization has created international 
research, development, and production that make diffusive controls less effective and 
competitively counter productive. The goal in globalization is to stay in control of key 
technologies in the global market. The way to do this and meet policy objectives with 
China is to stay engaged and maintain innovative leadership and market dominance. In 
order to accomplish this, much less attention on restrictive and ineffective controls and 
more attention to maintaining innovative leadership with China are required. The deeper 
the dependence on U.S. innovations, the more potential influence and control the United 
States has over China’s developmental directions.  
No matter where dual-use technology falls on the benign or less benign spectrum, 
it is difficult to control. The policy choice for the United States should be one that 
promotes the United States leadership in innovative technologies spanning the entire 
dual-use spectrum from benign to less benign innovations. Economic incentives used to 
ensure technological innovation stay centered in the United States should be the top 
                                                 
183 Arquilla, 366. 
 47
priority. “The United States must embrace emerging technologies and rapidly transform 
its current technological lead, if preserved, would increase our military strength while 
cutting costs…and reducing the risk to troops.”184 Given the current level of U.S. 
technological collaboration with China, emphasizing U.S. collaborative leadership will 
ensure the United States remain the primary driver of technology markets and standards. 
This policy choice must be supplemented with a new export control system to achieve 
and maintain the lead in current and future technological innovations. 
Globalization and diffusion of technological innovation has allowed China to 
continue to gain technologically on the recognized power of the United States. Today, 
China’s science and technology programs have overcome Japan and will soon bypass 
Europe in research and development spending.185 China has implemented this 
modernization program to coincide with a diplomatic, economic, political engagement of 
greater Asia. It has been argued that China is embracing and managing globalization, and 
associated economic interdependence, as a means to restrain U.S. unilateralist policies 
and promote a multi-polar international system of states.186 Understanding a realistic 
view or worst-case scenarios helps to understand and formulate preventative policy 
options that lend to a greatest outcome utility. Regional fear seems to be rising along with 
a rising China, so confronting and mitigating this fear is a priority as it lends itself to a 
spiraling security dilemma and possible regional arms race. The collaborative-
engagement policy with China must work to improve U.S. regional soft power as well as 
lowering the possibility of a regional security dilemma.  
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A. COMPREHENSIVE TRADE RELATIONS WITH CHINA  
With these regional dynamics in play, it is obvious the status-quo policy of 
engagement with ineffective export controls does not provide the economic or security 
leverage to be effective. It is imperative to develop a comprehensive 187 trade relation 
policy with China centered on technological innovation. The reason technological 
innovation is essential is that this is the United States’ traditional stronghold and because 
it is the driving factor of globalization.188 Therefore, maintaining control of this 
innovative engine of globalization through collaborative leadership supplemented with 
effective export controls is an economic and national security priority for the United 
States. This collaborative-engagement policy should incorporate other regional powers 
such as Japan and South Korea to form a U.S. collaborative sphere of influence.   
An important lesson learned from the HPC and satellite case studies is the 
realization that export controls alone will not meet U.S. objectives for mitigating China’s 
technological rise and prevent a possible security dilemma in East Asia.  If the United 
States does not adequately access the risk of new technology transfers to China and put in 
technology controls to prevent it from diffusing into China’s military, it could lead to an 
unintended arms race, and spiral into a full-blown war over sensitive issues such as 
Taiwan’s independence. The irony here would be that China would use U.S. 
technological innovations militarily to battle the United States.   
Conversely, the current bureaucratic export controls will not keep the United 
States, in a global market construct, technologically competitive and able to produce and 
control its future military technology requirements.  Taking a dichotomous view of 
export controls without acknowledging and factoring the strategic or long-term economic 
effects of globalization is counter-productive as shown in the satellite study.  Export 
controls should be dynamically inserted into the R&D phases.  In other cases, it is  
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impossible to control benign technology in a global market construct, due to its inherent 
innovative diffusive and so controlling processes and knowledge is essential as shown in 
the HPC study.  
China, as a beneficiary of globalization, has become or is becoming a leader in 
technological research and development. China’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is 
rising faster than every country on the planet.189 By taking advantage of the growing 
global market and continued innovative diffusion, China is able to acquire or produce 
advanced technology to allow it to compete with the United States commercially and 
militarily. This diffusion and increased capital has translated into an increasingly 
modernized military as well, far surpassing expectations.190  Facing these facts must be a 
priority factored into developing a trade policy with China. It must confront these 
specifics and result in a way of dealing with China’s rise, as well as satisfying U.S. 
regional and domestic interests. Additionally, achieving this will be commensurate with 
promoting U.S. technological competitiveness. Instead of trying to control technological 
diffusion, a need exists to construct technological innovation toward common positive 
utilitarian goals.  
Thus, given all the East Asian variables, there is a requirement for a more 
dynamic trade policy approach that focuses on U.S. technological collaborative and 
innovative leadership necessary to meet U.S. objectives. This action is termed Strategic 
Technological Collaborative Leadership (STCL), and would be supplemented with a 
superior technology control mechanism that would not interfere with trade to China.  It 
would however prevent its use in military applications.  This approach is far superior in 
meeting U.S. economic and security long-term interest than the mere use of engagement 
with tactical technological export controls.    
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B. POLICY OPTIONS 
1. Conservative Policy Option 
It is in the realist vein that security concerns with China’s hard power intentions 
call for a conservative regional foreign policy closer to containment with a restrictive 
technological trade policy. Many scholars and policy advisors have serious concerns 
regarding China’s rise and ambitions in East Asia and the implications for the United 
States.191 A powerful China could be able to hinder or even block the United States if it 
felt it is necessary to send forces to Asia to protect its interests there. For this reason, 
some scholars believe in both stricter trade controls with China, along with stricter 
control regimes that will limit or eliminate re-exportation to China from friendly 
countries that do not share the same security concerns about China, as does the United 
States.192 Another group argues about the precarious position the United States military 
industrial complex may find itself in if it becomes dependent upon technology owned by 
or imported from China.193 Still others see a possibility of China proliferating militarized 
western technology to rogue or enemy states such as Iran or North Korea.194 
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These examples describe the security concerns associated with liberal trade that 
does not adequately emphasize export controls and recognize China’s regional threat. 
Exporting dual-use technology, outsourcing research and development (R&D), and off 
shoring of U.S. companies to China only exacerbates the security implications China’s 
advancement brings. These concerns combine and cause many conservatives to call for 
increased export controls and regimes.  
While conservative arguments cover short-term security aspects, they do not 
adequately address a balancing of U.S. security needs with U.S. commercial 
competitiveness.  Additionally, it neither addresses the importance of maintaining U.S. 
strategic technological innovation nor collaborative leadership in global trade. There is a 
need to address the problems associated with the ability to control technological 
innovative diffusion within the global trade construct. Addressing these problems has 
become increasingly important, as the U.S. military has become increasingly reliant upon 
U.S. commercial competitiveness to meet its own technological requirements.195   
2. Liberal Policy Option 
Perhaps domestic politics and economic interdependence raise the cost or risk 
factors of overt power politics and power balancing. Liberal arguments such as these find 
support among such theories as the Democratic Peace Theory and the Kantian Peace 
Triangle.196 Unlike realism, liberalism brings the actor from the state to the domestic 
arena. 
The fundamental actors in international politics are individuals and private 
groups, who are on average rational and risk-adverse and who organize 
exchange and collective action to promote differential interests under 
constraints imposed by material scarcity, conflicting values, and variations 
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in societal influence…Socially differentiated individuals define their 
material and ideational interests independently of politics and then 
advance those interests through political exchange and collective action. 
Individuals and groups are assumed to act rationally in pursuit of material 
and ideal welfare.197  
The question for the liberal approach is how to define this ideal welfare? A need 
to focus groups, individuals, and indeed states on this ideal seems also necessary for the 
utility of this approach to work. The pursuit of material welfare and asymmetric 
economic interdependence did not allow Europe to escape the First World War when 
economic interdependency in Europe was very high.198 Perhaps it is how political leaders 
perceive future trade (pessimistic or optimistic) that determines whether they will go to 
war or not. With high interdependence, but a pessimistic view of future trade prospects, 
war can still break out.199 This idea connects the collective idea of how speculative future 
trade prospects are. With globalization and economic interdependence levels today, this 
would point out the dire consequences of a global economic downturn. The institutional 
checks and balances brought about through the liberal international institutional dynamics 
do provide better cooperation, due to less uncertainty, than under strict anarchy but only 
to a limit.200  
Liberal US-China trade policy prescribes a foreign policy of engagement with 
China. There are liberal arguments that point to China’s improved export control or the 
value of economic benefits attributed to a liberal U.S.-China trade policy. The argument 
in favor of a more liberal trade policy with China are contingent upon China’s adoption 
of improved export control regulations that cover missile technology, chemical weapons 
precursors and technology, and biological agent related items. This policy shift can be  
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attributed to China's increased recognition of the dangers that proliferation of these sorts 
of weapons and weapons systems pose to its own security and to an effort to improve 
relations with the United States.201 
The other large faction of scholars argues that keeping the U.S. trade policy 
liberal will discourage conflict between the United States and China. As interdependent 
trade increases between countries, the cost of conflict rises between the two trading 
partners. These arguments are against protectionist policies, such as export controls, 
which might dominate future U.S.-China relations. Most of these scholars down play 
security concerns and point to positive aspects of China’s rise, through its multilateral or 
bilateral engagement, good-neighbor policy, or just being incapable or unwilling to 
balance against the United States. They argue against viewing China as a threat and for 
the U.S. Congress to cooperate with China in mutually beneficial ways. It is in China’s 
interest to deepen and extend economic reform by opening its capital markets.202 Still 
others argue that globalization and engagement help maintain the United States’ lead in 
Science and Technology (S&T) knowledge dominance that is essential in maintaining 
military dominance against potential foes such as China.203  
The problem with these arguments of the more liberal policies is that they do not 
deal adequately with the security concerns of less benign technologies militarized by 
China and the threat China still poses to the region, specifically to Taiwan. Additionally, 
even though they are economically oriented, these arguments fail to address sustained 
U.S. technological competitiveness in a global construct where China is becoming a 
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strident competitor. As with the conservative policies, they do not address China’s 
unchecked soft power nor do they adequately address a plausible way of steering 
(controlling) regional technology innovation in a positive if not benign direction.  
3. Social Constructivist Policy Approach  
There is much at stake in this complexly interdependent world. The culture of fear 
created by the primal anarchic international system of states and the still petulant culture 
of risk versus reward trade-offs needs constructing toward a culture of collaboration and 
trust. This goal oriented culture works to influence positive social change, helping to 
steer the regional dynamics in a positive direction. A need exists for a policy that fosters 
newly constituted norms, knowledge, practices, and state identities through the social 
constructivist notion of “providing meaningful behavior or action within an 
intersubjective social context.”204 The conservative and liberal approaches fail to put in 
place the mechanism of positive change. With the conservative and liberal approach, the 
system drives the problem leaving realism or liberalism to chance. The Social 
Constructivist approach puts society in control of its own destiny and has the greatest 
utility for positive change.  The United States maintaining the leadership position in a   
collaborative sphere of influence will allow such a social dynamic that fosters this level 
of change.  
Constructivism argues, “Actors develop their relations with, and understanding of, 
others through the media of norms and practices…. ‘Constitutive norms and define an 
identity by specifying the actions that will cause others to recognize that identity and 
respond to it.’”205 An identity could be a great power state, rising state, rogue state, even 
the anarchic structural system of states. If this is the case, than it can be argued that 
without constitutive norms and practices, these “identities” are without definition and are 
void of meaning.206 These identities socially constructed through constitutive norms and 
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practices that work through the international system of anarchy are what states make 
it.207 There also can be different meanings of anarchy among states due to different 
communities of intersubjective understandings and practices. Anarchy then would 
become an “intersubjective anarchic structure.” The intersubjective structure determines 
the meaning of identities by others.208    
4. The Foundation of a Collaborative-Engagement Policy with China 
One key utility for building U.S. – China relations is through Strategic 
Technological Collaborative Leadership (STCL). The goal of the U.S. STCL is to stay 
ahead in existing and new pioneering technologies by using strategic collaborative 
networks both domestically and internationally.  These networks or spheres result in 
allow the United States to use STCL to ensure its collaborative partners all share the 
same understanding of the risks associated with sensitive technology transfers to China.  
Additionally, it focuses R&D to pursue ways of designing in new technology controls 
that ensures technology is only used as intended.  Additionally, by taking a leadership 
position, the United States retains critical collaborative knowledge essential for 
innovating new technologies. Due to shared interest, knowledge, and social pressure to 
solve environmental and energy demands, the United States can use a national 
technology incentive arranged in a collaborative arrangement to make positive change in 
the East Asian region now and in the future. Moreover, this will also allow for new spin-
on military innovations that ensures continued U.S. military prowess.  Leading in the 
innovative process to solve these important issues will require the efforts of many states, 
departments, and agencies that require a collaborative policy approach to meet common 
objectives.  The United States taking the lead in this process is the essence of the 
Strategic Technological Collaborative Leadership (STCL). 
The requirement for collective action to achieve common purpose or 
attack common problems is a natural consequence of the increasing 
integration of economies and societies. That requirement is bound to grow 
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as integration increases and becomes an ever more prominent aspect of 
international transactions among nations. Much of the existing 
international cooperation takes place in the private sector, without 
extensive government involvement; a large and growing portion of it 
requires the commitment and agreement of governments on subjects of 
substantial political and economic significance.209 
Technological collaboration not only increases innovative capacity but also with 
proper leadership draws regional players to shape technological innovations to meet 
regional socio-economic interests. Collaboration among states will increase as the need to 
solve global issues becomes more politically salient.210 The objective is framing these 
interests within a common utilitarian understanding created through social constructivist 
principles. The social interaction provided by the collaborative action brings about all of 
the constructivist promises. STCL enables the “collaborative-engagement” policy to be a 
successful strategic U.S. economic, and security tool. STCL is, therefore, a vital 
component of the collaborative engagement with China. Without such a tool, engagement 
is hollow or without means to an end. This tool gives the policy action to execute the 
greater ideals and utility proposed in the policy. With proper U.S. leadership, it provides 
a means of enabling the dynamics of social constructivism and soft power to work to the 
advantage of the United States’ liberal ideals.  
This environmental crisis left unchecked could negatively affect China’s 
economic expansion and political stability. This would have a negative effect on the 
global economy, which directly affects U.S. economic and security interests. Perhaps 
changing the anarchic intersubjective structure from an egoist form of “self-help” to a 
more utilitarian form would help prolong the global economic structure and ensure 
China’s, as well as the worlds’, political and economic survival. State survival provides 
the impetus for state behavior in the self-help intersubjective structure, so too in the 
utilitarian collaborative structure.  
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One instrument the United States could use to create a more utilitarian 
collaborative structure is through leadership in technological innovation. Technological 
innovation could hold the promise of solving many of China’s, and the entire East Asian 
environmental and energy issues now and in the future. This collaborative structure 
would only work to U.S. advantage by incorporating a dynamic technology control 
mechanism to protect and keep key innovative technologies centered in and controlled by 
the United States.  The collaborative engagement of East Asia would also ensure U.S. 
regional positive influence remains strong. Conversely, technological advancement is not 
always progressive as evidenced by the weaponization of dual-use technologies. The 
view of most scholars is that technology is neutral and needs shaping into either a benign 
or a less benign technology.211 In order to control or shape overall progression of 
technology innovation, it is useful to think of technology as a form of knowledge and 
knowledge as power.212  Knowledge is so vital it must be protected and incorporated into 
the export control apparatus.  The United States could build this power by maintaining its 
leadership position in helping solve China’s long standing environmental and energy 
difficulties while protecting these vital technology innovations. Moreover, the lead in this 
technology would allow the United States to maintain control over technology standards, 
and thus, the global market in key future technology sectors.  This part of the 
collaborative-engagement foreign policy should be coupled with the dynamic technology 
export control mechanism to ensure both economic and security requirements are met.  
Social Construction of Technology (SCT) is the ability of social interests to shape 
future technologies.213 If shaped toward utilitarian goals or interests, it would provide the 
means of replacing the “self-help” materialist intersubjective structure with a more 
utilitarian structure. The intersubjective interests evidenced in China’s social demands 
over environmental issues and energy needs makes social shaping of technology feasible 
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and likely to influence government policy toward more benign technology advancements, 
which will meet these social demands and spur economic growth. This common social 
interest is feasible enough to be politically, socially, and economically feasible in the 
greater East Asia region where Malthusian issues will only get greater in the coming 
years.214  
SCT provides a way of shaping new technology to promote goal oriented ideas 
and roles that steer technological innovations and regional social dynamics in a positive 
direction. A U.S. led social construction of technology would then provide the means of 
making the utilitarian structure a reality. Melding the social dynamic of SCT into STCL 
creates the motive force driving the collaborative-engagement policy with China. One 
major goal of this collaborative policy would be to create a power balance in East Asia 
based on knowledge and science. This knowledge power has a socially transforming 
effect that can translate into greater social, economic, political interaction and utility.215 
This dynamic as previously stated lowers uncertainty, security dilemmas, and negative 
economic and environmental factors. This type of competition is not pessimistic but 
socially constructed for the betterment of humankind and long-term survival. U.S. 
collaborative-engagement would mitigate the realist regional tendencies and increase the 
global economic side of the liberal argument as trade and profit would increase. It would 
spur new technological competitiveness and provide the United States with continued 
access to new technological innovations that directly benefit military industrial concerns.  
The United States leads in technological research and development and innovative 
capability; therefore, it should lead in this collaborative role. This leadership would 
ensure U.S. economic gains, technological standards and competitiveness, and as a 
design function, could shape technological innovations to a benign utilitarian nature 
demanded by society.216 This would be a much more effective and comprehensive 
approach then relying on ineffective export controls to limit less benign technological 
innovations and weaponization of those technologies.  
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5. Implementation of the (Collaborative-Engagement) Policy 
This collaborative-engagement policy is both domestic and international.  
Domestically the policy must be a national strategic technology initiative with Executive 
Branch support and many collaborative branches.  This policy is analogous to a 
strategically focused Science and Technology (S&T) policy that focuses on technological 
innovative and collaborative leadership with an incorporated dynamic export control 
mechanism.  The U.S. President must set the urgency for this policy.  
Now is the time to make these changes. Long-standing budgetary 
constraints preclude the State Department from vigorous action, even if 
the will to act were there. The initiative must come from elsewhere: the 
scientific and engineering communities, the White House, and the  
Congress. Leaders from all these groups recognize that in the post-Cold 
War era, S&T and foreign policy have more, not fewer, inter-
relationships.217 
The first step would be to abolish the U.S. policy that hampers certain 
technological collaborative efforts with China. These restrictions include overseas private 
investment corporations and the U.S. – Asia Environmental Partnership after the 
Tiananmen Square Protest in 1989.218 These restrictions hamper the U.S. ability to affect 
a collaborative-engagement policy with China. This should only be lifted when a new 
dynamic export control system ensures new innovative technologies vital for U.S. 
military requirements are met.  Additionally, the U.S. government must be ready to 
subsidize U.S. technological innovations that warrant export controls.  This allows an 
ability to grow indigenous innovations on a level playing field with its global 
competitors.  Innovations under this policy would be somewhat more expensive initially 
when unable to take immediate advantage of the global market.  Federal investment is 
critical to making this new form of export controls a reality.  This effort must be a very 
high priority for the government and the entire country.    
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To influence the shaping of China’s and the East Asian regions technological 
development toward a more benign utilitarian course, a regional collaborative triad or 
quad will need to be constructed.  This will require a very diligent multilateral diplomatic 
effort arising from the U.S. State Department. The State Department through its 
ambassadorships and trade representatives must start its own collaborative network to 
formulate and shape the intersubjective interests themselves. This network would foster 
collaboration to develop new technologies to improve environmental conditions and 
energy demands.  “The environment provides a natural and non-threatening vehicle to 
advance U.S. interests not only in China’s environmental protection efforts but also in its 
basic human rights practices and trade opportunities.”219 In order to do this, the State 
Department must recognize how essential technology is to foreign policy, and therefore, 
delegate the STCL initiative to key science and technology institutions such as DARPA 
and the Nano Science and Technology Institute for execution and coordination.220  
Japan and South Korea would be two key players within a multilateral triad with 
the United States being the other collaborator. These two countries already collaborate 
with China in a number of environmental areas such as acid rain and marine fishery 
monitoring and management, and they thus provide an excellent starting point.221 A 
diplomatic push for consensus between these two countries first would accomplish two 
vital objectives. First, it would help foster better relations between these two countries 
and help to get past years of historical friction and mistrust. Second, it would strengthen 
U.S. soft power and help to counter-balance China’s regional influence. The check of 
China’s rising soft power could mitigate the possibility of China “isolating and 
defeating,” and possibly using force against Taiwan.222  Additionally, by maintaining a 
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U.S. collaborative umbrella, Japan does not have the need to develop nuclear weapons 
that could complicate the regional situation with a Sino-Japanese nuclear arms race.223   
South Korea and Japan would have to agree to a new stricter Wassenaar control 
mechanism that would ensure vital technology innovative knowledge that is 
collaboratively developed will not be transferred to China. With a stricter Wassenaar 
agreement, the United States, Japan, and South Korea form a collaborative sphere of 
influence that can better focus technologies to find solutions to energy and environmental 
issues.  This collaboration, coupled with designed-in technology controls, prevents secret 
technology innovations from reaching China while promoting new innovative trade 
throughout the East Asian region.  It will also allow the United States to expand 
technology controls to create an export control regime effectively in East Asia.  The 
United States would of course be the leader of the collaborative East Asian sphere.  
The Commerce Department will have to better coordinate collaborative trade 
activities and better advise all levels of U.S. government of the trade policy adjustments 
required to remain the strategic collaborative leader. The main emphasis of the 
Commerce Department’s leadership should not only negotiate with Japan and South 
Korea but also the EU, Canada, and others to form new collaborative spheres that can 
effectively control dual-use technology.  These collaborative spheres should renegotiate 
the Wassenaar agreement to incorporate new designed-in technology controls.  This 
would enhance economic cooperation with U.S. allies and ensure China is not allowed to 
diffuse sensitive technology into its military.  This network will also ensure a 
collaborative use of technology between the U.S. – EU that reduces the time lag it takes 
to get satellite technology to market created by the old bureaucratic export control 
process.224  It would also ensure issues such as the loss of the GPS technology due to 
lack of collaboration, as nearly occurred in the satellite case, is avoided.  Conversely, it  
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should also work to enhance cooperation and communication with China on trade issues 
and new multilateral initiatives that bring China closer into new interactions with the West.   
In order to keep U.S innovative entrepreneurialism, science and technology 
education is vital.  Without this innovative strength, export controls are a mute point. The 
Department of Education’s role in this policy is vital. Without well-educated citizenry, 
the United States cannot expect to remain the technological innovative or collaborative 
leader. There is a need for scientists and engineers that are collaborating internationally to 
solve the many problems facing states within the GPE. Without a strong export control 
mechanism, which protects entrepreneurial innovative risk, the United States may face an 
exodus of innovation.  Fully understanding and capitalizing on the benefits of an 
international collaborative educational system, the United States will be able to maintain 
its STCL status particularly in East Asia. “The American people should better understand 
the importance of international S&T, including both the scientific benefits to American 
researchers and the important spillover effects on U.S. foreign policy.”225 Mathematics, 
science, and philosophy are key areas to provide understanding to all of the vital 
technical, economic, and social objectives of this policy. Implementing a collaborative 
educational effort at the university levels allows a joint learning experience between U.S. 
and foreign students. This would benefit the collaborative social environment needed to 
keep this effort moving forward. All of these efforts will help to ensure U.S. 
technological competitiveness in the global marketplace. A strong national collaborative 
education initiative would make the Department of Education a more relevant player in 
the global context. Conversely, restrictive national export controls stifle the collaborative 
educational opportunity due to the restricted nature of knowledge sharing. Many global 
universities do not collaboratively engage with U.S. universities due to complicated 
export controls limiting the exchange of sensitive research knowledge.226  This puts the 
United States at a collaborative disadvantage, which undermines future U.S. innovative 
and collaborative leadership potential.  A dynamic export control system that is built into 
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the collaborative R&D structure that more effectively communicates what types of 
information and processes can be used to collaborate abroad is needed. That is the reason 
this policy calls for a strategic collaborative technology policy to ensure strategic 
communication that mitigates mistakes is realized.    
Saving the most important for last, DARPA is integral to making the entire 
collaborative-engagement policy a reality.  DARPA should be reorganized to focus its 
R&D into new ways of protecting technologies from being used outside its intended 
purpose by any country outside the U.S. collaborative sphere.  Just as important as 
designing in quality into technology, so is designing in control.  DARPA must focus on 
new ways of controlling technology like black box technologies that self-destruct when 
used for other than intended purposes.  Another innovation would be to develop new 
encrypted software technologies that self-destruct if tampered with or used incorrectly.227  
In order for this to be done effectively and efficiently, DARPA must be directly involved 
with the collaborative research and development of new technologies in the United 
States.     
Most importantly is that DARPA must collaborate with other engineering and 
science researchers and developers to build in these new types of control technologies.  
This would be vital because DARPA must be able to determine which technology 
innovations have military use, assess the risk, and integrate technology controls into the 
design process.  This would keep DARPA at the cutting edge of technology innovations 
and able to effectively plan and adapt new controls into the innovative process.  This 
would help in controlling dual-use technology areas, such as High Performance 
Computing, that are rapidly innovating.  DARPA would also be able to analyze processes 
that need to have technologies developed to protect them, such as with cluster computing.  
All this requires technology controls becoming a integral part of the R&D process.  This 
process would be DARPA’s focus.  Being involved early in the design process saves 
money and allows more communication about protecting technology transfers.  DARPA 
must also be the conduit for the U.S. government to invest in this new type of technology 
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control research.  DARPA then can determine which technology needs subsidizing early 
in the design process and protect these vital controlled technologies until they are fully 
developed and globally competitive.  By developing new black box technology controls 
or technologies that can only be used as intended, strengthens intellectual property rights 
in the United States as well.  This strengthens entrepreneurial innovation and ensures 
U.S. technological competitiveness.228   
The main importance here is that DARPA is a collaborative partner that is now 
developing new technological innovations that have built-in export controls.  This 
“designed in” approach is the key to limiting sensitive technology transfers to China with 
limited disruption to commercial trade.  For this reason, a doubling of basic and applied 
research and development is necessary.  Frontier technological innovations are found 
through basic and applied research. It is imperative for DARPA and its research 
consortium to collaborate with the EPA, NSTI, DOE, DOD MIC, national labs, 
universities, as well as other countries collaborative structures, on these new 
technological control developments.  This will ensure the United States has long term and 
efficient spin-on military applications, and continued commercial technology 
competitiveness.  With DARPA designing in technology control, the State and 
Commerce Department’s implementation of export controls as an after thought is 
eliminated.    
C. CONCLUSION 
Globalization has allowed China’s technological power to rise dramatically. 
Technological innovative diffusion has already taken place and is expected to continue. It 
is time for a change in U.S. trade relations; one that focuses less on archaic protectionists' 
measures and more on dynamic competitive strategies. While dangers and security 
concerns do exist in the East Asian region, the realist and liberal approach for controlling 
technological diffusion fails to adequately control technology transfers to China, or meet 
U.S. security and economic competitiveness needs.   
                                                 
228 James A. Lewis, 1-4. 
 65
A policy which shapes technological innovation while at the same time protects it 
from transfer to China, is found in the social constructivist’ international relations theory 
which allows change by shaping the intersubjective web of understanding. Specifically, 
this is done by replacing the self-help intersubjective structure, found within the 
materialist’ concerns, with a more utilitarian structure of collaboration.  Of course, this 
can only be realized if technology innovation is safely centered in and controlled by the 
United States. To do this, a collaborative-engagement policy with China should be 
implemented that puts in place a dynamic new technology control approach coupled with 
U.S. strategic leadership in technological collaboration abroad.  This combination ensures 
technology is used only for intended purposes, and ensures technology stays centered 
within U.S. control.  
The way to combat these issues, while at the same time countering China’s soft 
power rise, increasing regional stability, and prolonging economic growth, is through a 
policy of collaborative-engagement. Combining the theory of Social Construction of 
Technology (SCL) with a Strategic Technological Collaborative Leadership (STCL) 
along with a dynamic technology control mechanism, forms the main instrument of the 
collaborative-engagement policy. With innovations designed to safeguard sensitive 
technology, the United States can implement this collaborative-engagement policy to 
maintain the lead in regional knowledge, technology, and influence. It can use this policy 
to help socially-shape new technologies into more benign technologies made to maximize 
utility. By forming a strategic triad of collaboration with Japan, South Korea, EU, and 
Canada, it can work through regional collaborative spheres of influence to strategize 
environmental, energy, and security issues within this new intersubjective structure to 
create a new era of trust, cooperation, and communication.    
Making this work will require top down leadership in the United States to make 
this a national priority with adequate resources. This priority will require huge 
investments and reforms in many governmental, as well as commercial technological 
research areas. This reform would be one that implements a structure of collaboration 
among all research and education areas. Of course, a huge investment in basic education 
that focuses on collaborative learning is essential. Thus, given all of the East Asian 
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variables, there is a requirement for a more dynamic trade policy approach that focuses 
on U.S. technological collaborative and innovative leadership necessary to meet U.S. 
objectives. This collaborative-engagement policy is far superior in meeting U.S. long 
term economic and security interest than the mere use of engagement with tactical export 
controls that are a mere after thought.   
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IV. ENTER NANOTECHNOLOGY 
The significance of this thesis culminates in the discussion of Nanotechnology, 
which has the potential of bringing a true broad-based technology revolution. This 
technology is likely to produce many innovations with moral, ethical, and security 
implications stemming from the variety of innovation possibilities.229 This new 
technology equates or exceeds the importance of the development of the computer or 
even the nuclear bomb. The world stands at the precipice to determine who will control 
this upcoming technology.  
Nanotechnology is the ability to produce and manipulate matter at the molecular 
scale. This technology and its innovative applications has revolutionary applications in 
the IT area such as extremely small, efficient, and cost effective computational devices, 
sensors, and switches. Nanotechnology also holds promising advances in biomedical field 
but does portend some rather negative military implications. Nanotechnology could 
economize current satellite cost while introducing new missions such as tactical space 
support and logistics.230 Additionally, this technology has an even darker side; “In 
addition, advances could empower the proliferation of currently controlled processing 
capabilities (e.g. nuclear isotope separation) with associated threats to national 
security.”231 Unlike satellite and HPC technology, nanotechnology is still in its infancy 
where research and development will be critical to determine who will become the leader 
in this field. Nanotechnology straddles between HPC and satellite technology in terms of 
the benign technology level with many implications still to be determined. 
With nanotechnology offering the possibility of a true technology revolution, the 
battle for the global market has begun through research and development of this coming 
technology. China has shown remarkable progress in this technology because it offers the 
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goal of the 863 plan and a shot at controlling the global market through the technological 
innovation it provides. Since the year 2000, China’s world share of core international 
scientific journal articles related to nanotechnology is second only to the United States.232 
Journal articles are a well-respected indicator of research output. What is more 
remarkable is the noted sustainable exponential growth of nanotechnology articles and 
citations, which is unique to all countries conducting this type of research.233 Conversely, 
the United States, although possessing a greater world share of journal articles related to 
nanotechnology, has recently had a flat or slightly decreasing output rate.234 “These 
results indicate of China’s excess capacities to launch more research in nanotechnology, 
since expertise and manpower are available in nano-relevant sciences.”235  
With the importance of maintaining the lead in nanotechnology research evident, 
it is vital to use this technology within the collaborative framework. Being an inherently 
interdisciplinary endeavor, global collaboration in nanotechnology is crucial for the 
United States to maintain the lead in technological innovations nanotechnology promises. 
China has no barriers preventing collaboration with the development of nanotechnology 
whereas the United States may if it continues its antiquated protectionist controls against 
such collaboration due to fears of sharing knowledge.  However, there are areas that the 
United States has collaborated with the world. The U.S. EPA and Energy Departments 
have pioneered research into the environmental and energy implications of 
nanotechnology. This research has brought about numerous breakthroughs using 
nanotechnology in the areas of pollution clean up, detection, removal, and prevention.236 
“Nano-sized cerium oxide has been developed to decrease diesel emissions, and iron 
nanoparticles can improve detection and tracking of contaminants.”237 It has also brought 
                                                 
232 Ping Zhou and Loet Leydesdorff, “The Emergence of China as a Leading Nation of Science,” 
Research Policy (forthcoming): 30. 
233 Ibid. 
234 Ibid., 21. 
235 Ibid., 22. 
236 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “Nanotechnology White Paper,” Science Policy Council 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, External Review Draft (2005): 9. 
237 Ibid. 
 70
to light revolutionary energy production solution that can meet East Asia’s growing 
energy demands.238 Nanotechnology is a multidisciplinary technology requiring 
collaboration within the fields of nanotechnology, biotechnology, information 
technology, and cognitive technology. The unique nano-innovations developed by the 
collaborative nature of these fields create new challenges in achieving effective 
environmental regulations and standards.239 “As these technologies progress and as novel 
products emerge, increasingly, the EPA will find that meeting constantly changing 
demands will require proactive actions and planning.”240 With the EPA leading the way 
in developing this revolutionary technology toward environmental protection, it is 
imperative that this agency be a collaborator.  Collaborative-engagement with Japan, 
South Korea, EU, and Canada forming spheres of influence to control less benign 
innovations from transferring to China is the goal. It is also imperative that the EPA 
collaborate with DARPA and all the universities and research labs within the United 
States and worldwide.  DARPA will have to design in technology controls into this 
rapidly innovative technology.  With this technology inherently collaborative, having a 
collaborative structure in place both domestically and internationally is essential to 
remain the nanotechnology innovative leader.  Additionally, this structure promotes IPR 
that motivates entrepreneurial innovators to invest, and keep the technology based in the 
United States.  With this all in place, the United States military will be assured access to 
nanotechnology spin-on innovations to use directly in military application.  
A. CONCLUSION 
Globalization, innovation, and diffusion of technology have worked well to allow 
China to skip existing technologies to focus on new innovative ones. This leapfrog 
approach has allowed China, through technology transfer and sustained domestic and 
foreign investments, to focus on new technologies without having to worry about 
cumbersome military industrial infrastructure costs. China can focus on a technical 
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revolution to allow it to close the technology gap with the West, in particular, the United 
States. China also seeks to use globalization and its interdependence as a controlling 
factor over the United States.241 Economic interdependence brought on through the 
process of globalization and its associated diffusion of technology makes customary 
export controls a losing proposition in trying to slow China’s advance. These 
protectionist measures will not keep China from advancing new technological 
innovations. China has already obtained, diffused, and mastered much of the forbidden 
technologies that U.S. export controls seek to confine to the United States. Unfortunately, 
for China, these technological advances come with a price. However, the United States 
already provides China much needed technical collaboration in developing new 
innovative technologies. To ensure this collaboration is maximized within the United 
States, and among its allies, a collaborative-engagement policy that is comprised of a 
national STCL initiative, and dynamic technology controls is required.  
China’s serious research in nanotechnology, as a continuation of its successful 
863 R&D program, shows its intention to close the technology gap with the United 
States. Without a serious commitment to research and development by the United States, 
this may indeed become reality. As shown in the case studies, educational complacency 
paired with ineffective export and foreign policies have jeopardized the U.S. lead in 
technology innovation. Military necessity early in the Cold War focused increased 
research into major innovation, so a new emphasis on frontier technologies such as 
nanotechnology, must ensure that the research output exceeds that of China.  
The Nano Science and Technology Institute (NSTI) would be the main 
commercial coordination point for frontier technology related research. NSTI should 
encompass all future initiatives for competitiveness and meld them into this future 
technology. NSTI should create a program tailored to take on the research aspects of the 
collaborative-engagement STCL with its counterparts in the East Asia region, EU, and 
Canada. One main goal would be to collaborate with East Asian countries on such 
important issues as managing the risk future technologies, such as nanotechnology, have 
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on the population, environment, and natural resources.242  NSTI should expand and start 
a collaborative network throughout the East Asia region becoming a primary driver of 
this new policy. NSTI’s extensive nanotechnology related research networks and 
databases make it an ideal collaboration leadership point for the United States. This will 
ensure U.S. nanotechnology collaborative dominance is maintained.  This effort 
combined with DARPA, and the rest of the policies collaborators will preserve the United 
States’ competitive edge into the future.  
Through the Nanotech Conference Series, the NSTI has made partnerships 
or received endorsements from a large range of significant 
nanotechnology industries or initiatives including; Defense Advanced 
Project Agency (DARPA), National Science Foundation (NSF), National 
Nanotechnology Coordination Office (NNCO), Sloan Foundation, 
Electron Device Society (IEEE-EDS), Nanotech-Inst of American Society 
of Mechanical Engineers (ASME), American Physical Society (APS), 
American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE), American Ceramics 
Society, Swiss Nanotechnology Initiative, State of Massachusetts and over 
250 participating, sponsoring or exhibiting technical and financial 
companies.243  
The collaborative-engagement policy would focus U.S. innovative strengths 
toward regional collaborative efforts to solve the serious environmental and energy issues 
it now faces. This leadership will work to change the regional social dynamic, and reduce 
fear and mistrust while increasing strategic communications and trust. For the United 
States, this policy works to maintain U.S. technological competitiveness, which also 
translates to superior military technological access. This leadership position would also 
allow the United States to increase its regional soft power thus balancing China’s rising 
regional influence. The collaborative-engagement with China will be critical with the 
impending revolution in technology brought on by the oncoming nanotechnology era. 
Nanotechnology has the greatest opportunity to solve these regional environmental and 
energy challenges. The United States working with China, and the region, can use its 
leadership to implement strong environmental controls and enforcement structures that 
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could help to open China’s bureaucracy to positive change all the while controlling 
sensitive technology control to China more effectively and efficiently.  
In the end, whoever masters innovation of such avant-garde technologies, such as 
nanotechnology, will control the global market and reap the rewards of this technological 
revolution. Such technologies will have military applications, and may require some form 
of export control as determined on a case-by-case basis. However, in a global economy, 
the increase in national security provided by such controls must far outweigh the loss of 
global commercial competitiveness and market shares to rival competitors, as seen in the 
satellite case study.  This requires DARPA to collaborate in the R&D of new technology 
innovations to design in technology controls that work in the global economy.  In 
response to this new global economy, the United States must re-form its educational 
system to become a more collaborative educational network, invest heavily in new 
technology, and strengthen the Wassenaar agreement to adapt to these new controls.  It 
should also promote a domestic and international collaborative leadership structure to 
influence and control technological development in the global marketplace.  These 
collaborative spheres of influence would have the shared innovative knowledge 
controlled by the strengthened Wassenaar agreement and technology controls.    
If the United States fails to lead in collaborative technology development, it is 
plausible that China could surpass the United States in nanotechnology research, set new 
standards and control the market as the United States did throughout most of the Cold 
War. This could precipitate a new and very dangerous arms race resulting in new deadly 
military innovations from China following a more techno-nationalist path. This would 
lead to increasing regional fears, security dilemmas, and possible wars. In order to 
mitigate this undesirable outcome, a nationally led collaborative-engagement foreign and 
trade policy with China is required. This policy would center on U.S. Strategic 
Technological Collaborative Leadership (STCL) that uses U.S. innovative knowledge for 
the greatest utility, rather than relying solely on inferior protectionist or strict laissez-faire 
policy measures.  This philosophy combines with a dynamic technology control structure 
built into the collaborative R&D, and collaborative spheres of influence, make this a 
winning proposition for the United States economic and security interests. 
 74
LIST OF REFERENCES 
AFP, Brussels. December 18, 2001, US Warns EU about Galileo's Possible Military 
Conflicts. 
Alexander, Lamar. United States Senator, Press Release. 
http://alexander.senate.gov/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressReleases.Detail&PressR
elease_Id=1109 (accessed October 2007). 
Amarel, Saul. “AJ Research in DARPA’s Strategic Computing Initiative.” IEEE Expert, 
6:3 (June 1991): 7-11. 
Anton, Philip S., Richard Silberglitt, and James Schneider. “The Global Technology 
Revolution: Bio/Nano/Material trend and their synergies with Information 
Technology by 2015.” National Defense Research Institute RAND (2001), 30. 
Arquilla, John. “Patterns of Commercial Diffusion.” In The Diffusion of Military 
Technology and Ideas, ed. Emily O. Goldman and Leslie C. Eliason (Stanford, 
CA, Stanford University Press, 2003), 348. 
ASTM Standardization News. “MilSpec Reform: Completed.” An interview with 
Gregory E. Saunders, Defense Standardization Program Office, 2001, 1, 2 
http://www.astm.org/SNEWS/NOVEMBER_2001/saunders_nov01.html 
(accessed February 2007). 
Barbieri, Katherine and Gerald Schneider. “Globalization and Peace: Assessing New 
Directions in the Study of Trade and Conflict.” Journal of Peace Research 36 
(1999): 387-404; James Dorn, “China’s future: Constructive Partner or Emerging 
Threat.” CATO Institute (2000): 5. 
Beck, Michael. “Russia’s Rationale for Developing Export Controls.” in Bertsch and 
Grillot, Arms on the Market, 42. 
Bergman, Barry. Research under fire: In the war on terror, academic freedom could wind 
up as collateral damage, UC Berkeley News 
http://www.berkeley.edu/news/berkeleyan/2005/01/27_acfreedom.shtml 
(accessed October 2007). 
Bernstein, Richard and Ross H. Munro. The Coming Conflict with China. (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1997): 217. 
Besselman, Joseph, Ashish Arora, and Patrick Larkey. “Buying in a Business Fashion-
And Paying More.” Public Administration Review, 60:5 (2000): 423. 
 75
Blustein, Paul. “China Plays Rough: ‘Invest and Transfer Technology, or No Market 
Access’.” Washington Post, October 25, 1997, C1. 
Brandenburg, Craig. “US Navy COTS: A Double Edged Sword.” Navy Sea Systems 
Command NDIA Conference (October 22-25, 2001): 1. 
Chaim, Braun C. “Proliferation Rings: New Challenges to the Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Regime.” International Security 29:2 (2004), 5-49. 
Clarke, Duncan, Daniel B. O’Connor, and Jason D. Ellis. Send Guns and Money: 
Security Assistance and the U.S. Foreign Policy (Westport, Conn.: Praeger 1997): 
175-78. 
Clinton, William J. and Albert Gore, Jr. Technology for America’s Economic Growth: A 
New Direction to Build Economic Strength, February 22, 1993, 9. 
CNET news.com. China to build national computing grid, 2003, 
http://news.com.com/China+to+build+national+computing+grid/2100-1010_3-
5082097.html (accessed on September 5, 2006). 
CNET News.com. China, AMD team on Opteron supercomputer, 
http://news.com.com/2100-1006_3-5055317.html (accessed August 2007). 
CNNMoney.com. Rain or Shine, IBM Supercomputer to Power Official Weather 
Forecasts for Beijing: China Taps IBM for Meteorological Expertise, (2007) 
http://money.cnn.com/news/newsfeeds/articles/marketwire/0291367.htm 
(accessed August 2007).  
Copeland, Dale C. “Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade 
Expectations.” International Security, 20:4 (1996): 2. 
Cox Report. U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns With the 
People’s Republic of China, Select Committee United States House of 
Representatives, 1999, Chapter 1. 
Cox Report. U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s 
Republic of China, Select Committee United States House of Representatives, 
1999, Chapters 1, 18. 
CRS Report to Congress. Federal Research and Development Funding: FY2006, 
Washington, D.C., RL32799, 2005, 1. 
CRS. Hong Kong-U.S. Economic Relations, RS20786, Washington, D.C., 2005, 4. 
CRS. The Export Administration Act: Controversy and Prospects, RL30689, 2003, 2. 
DARPA website. http://web-ext2.darpa.mil/mto/programs/amtp/index.html (accessed 
March 2007). 
 76
Davis, Ruth M. “The DOD Initiatives in Integrated Circuits.” IEEE Computer (July 
1979): 79. 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. http://www.darpa.mil/mto/nemsst/ 
(accessed December 2006). 
Defense Standardization Office. “MilSpec Reform Final Report: An Ending a New 
Beginning.” DOD, Washington, D.C. (2001): 1. 
Deng, Yong and Thomas G. Moore. “China Views Globalization toward a New Great-
Power Politics?” The Washington Quarterly 27:3 (2004): 118-126, 126. 
Department of Defense. Quadrennial Defense Review Report (DOD: Washington, D.C. 
2006): 28-30. 
Duga, Jules and Tim Studt. “Globalization Alters Traditional R&D Rules.” R&D 
Magazine (September 2006):5, G1-G17. 
Economy, Elizabeth C. The River Runs Black: The Environmental Challenge to China’s 
Future. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY (2005), 273. 
Eliason, Leslie C. and Emily O. Goldman. “Theoretical and Comparative Perspective on 
Innovation and Diffusion.” In The Diffusion of Military Technology and Ideas, ed. 
Emily O. Goldman and Leslie C. Eliason (Stanford, CA, Stanford University 
Press, 2003), 1. 




“Fresh Start for Wassenaar.” Intelligence News-letter, September 3, 1998. 
FAS.org. USIS: Washington File, Text: State Dept.'s Holum on Multilateral Export 
Controls (2000) http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/export/news/000412-export-
usia1.htm (accessed October 2007). 
Fearon, James D. “Domestic Politics, Foreign Policy, and Theories of International 
Relations.” Annual Reviews of Political Science 1 (1998). 
Feigenbaum, Evan A. “Who’s behind China’s High-Technology ‘Revolution’?: How 
Bomb Makers Remade Beijing’s Priorities, Policies, and Institutions.” 
International Security, 24:1 (1999): 98. 
Fisher, Richard. “How America’s Friends Are Building China’s Military Power.” 
Heritage Foundation Backgrounder no. 1146 (1997). 
 77
Flannagan, Stephen J., Ellen L. Frost, and Richard L. Kugler. Challenges of the Global 
Century: Report of the Project on Globalization and National Security (National 
Delaware University, Washington, D.C., 2001), 9. 
Fong, Glenn R. Breaking New Ground or Breaking the Rules: Strategic Reorientation in 
U.S. Industrial Policy, International Security, 25:2 (2000): 153, 168-169. 
Galileo Joint Operable Committee (GJOC). Memo. 
Gallagher, Michael G. “China's Illusory Threat to the South China Sea.” International 
Security 19: 1 (1994): 169-194. 
GAO, Export Controls, Information on the Decision to Revise High Performance 
Computer Controls, GAO/NSIAD 98-196, Washington, D.C., 1998, 30. 
Gertz, Bill. “China Aided Iran Chemical Arms.” Washington Times, October 30, 1997, 
A1.  
Gertz, Bill. China Sub stalks U.S. Fleet, The Washington Times (November 13, 2006) 
http://www.washtimes.com/national/20061113-121539-3317r.htm (accessed 
November 2006). 
Gholz, Eugene and Harvey M. Sapolsky. “Restructuring the U.S. Defense Industry.” 
International Security, 24:3 (Winter 1999-2000): 5-7. 
Gill, Bill and Taeho Kim. China’s Arms Acquisition from Abroad. (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1995). 
Global Security.Org. Weapons of Mass Destruction: Nuclear Weapons Test. Global 
Security.Org (October 9, 2006) 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/nuke-test.htm (accessed 
November 2006). 
Goldman, Emily O. “Receptivity to Revolution.” In The Diffusion of Military Technology 
and Ideas, ed. Emily O. Goldman and Leslie C. Eliason (Stanford, CA, Stanford 
University Press, 2003), 301. 
Goldman, Emily O. and Andrew L. Ross. “The Diffusion of Military Technology and 
Ideas-Theory and Practice.” In The Diffusion of Military Technology and Ideas, 
ed. Emily O. Goldman and Leslie C. Eliason (Stanford, CA, Stanford University 
Press, 2003), 377-380. 
Goldstein, Avery. “Great Expectations: Interpreting China's Arrival.” International 
Security 22: 3 (Winter 1997/98): 43. 
Gompert, David C. “Right Makes Might: Freedom and Power in the Information Age.” 
McNair Paper 59, (1998): 2. 
 78
Hawken, Paul. The Ecology of Commerce. New York Harper Business Publication 
(1993). 
Hooker, Jake and Huang Yuanxi. The New York Times, Beneath Booming Cities, 
China’s future is drying up, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/28/world/asia/28water.html?_r=1&oref=slogin 
(accessed October 2007). 
Hopf, Ted. “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory.” 
International Security 23:1 (1998): 190. 
Hugill, Peter J. “Technology, its Innovation and Diffusion as the Motor of Capitalism.” 
Comparative Technology Transfer and Society 1:1 (2003): 89-100.  
IBM, Intel, Lucent Technologies, Sun- Microsystems, and Advanced Micro Devices 
(AMD) Websites. 
IBM.com. IBM Shifts Global Procurement Headquarters to China. http://www-
03.ibm.com/press/us/en/pressrelease/20422.wss (accessed August 2007).  
Intel.com. Intel Celebrates 20 years In China: New Investments Reinforce Commitment 
to Chinese Innovation and Education (2005). 
http://www.intel.com/pressroom/archive/release/20050613corp_a.htm (accessed 
August 2007). 
Jane’s Information Group. “The Evolution of COTS in the Defense Industry.” Jane's 




(accessed September 2006). 
Johnson, Ann. “Revisiting Technology as Knowledge.” Perspective in Science 13:4 
(2005): 554, 555. 
Johnson-Freese, Joan. “A New U.S.-Sino Space Relationship: Moving Toward 
Cooperation.” Astropolitics 1 (2006): 140, 141. 
Johnston, Alastair Iain. “Is China a Status Quo Power?” International Security 27:4 
(2003): 5-8. 
Johnston, Robert. “U.S. Export Control Policy in High Performance Computer Sector.” 
Nonproliferation Review 5 (1998): 52-54. 
Kang, David C. “Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for a New Analytical Framework.” 
International Security 27:4 (2003): 61. 
 79
Kang, David C. “Hierarchy, Balancing, and Empirical Puzzles in Asian International 
Relations.” International Security 28:3 (2003/04): 172-179. 
Katzenstein, Peter J. and Nobuo Okawara. “Japan, Asian-Pacific Security, and the Case 
for Analytical Eclecticism.” International Security 26:3 (2001/02): 154. 
Keiper, Adam. “The Nanotechnology Revolution.” The New Atlantis, Number 2, 
(Summer 2003): 17-34. 
Kellner, Douglas. “Theorizing Globalization.” Sociological Theory 20:3 (2002): 286. 
Keohane, Robert O. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in World politics 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). 
Koslowski, Rey and Friedrich Kratochwil. “Understanding Change in International 
Politics.” 219. 
Kristensen, Hans. China Test-Launches New Ballistic Missile, FAS.org Strategic 
Security Blog: A Project of the Federation of American Scientist (2006). 
http://fas.org/blog/ssp/2006/09/china_testlaunches_new_ballist.php (accessed 
August 2007). 
Li, Zijun. Deserts Swallowing up China’s Grasslands and Cities (June 1, 2006). 
http://www.worldwatch.org/node/3963 (accessed June 2007).  
Lieberman, Joseph I. “Offshore Outsourcing and America’s Competitive Edge: Losing 
out in the High Technology R&D and Service Sectors.” U.S. Senate (2004): 5-20. 
Lieggi, Stephanie. China’s White Paper on Nonproliferation: Export Controls Hit the Big 
Time, Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) (2003). 
http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_36a.html (accessed December 2006); 
Government Accountability Office, Foreign Trade Law in China and its Revision 
(GAO: Washington, D.C. 2005): 50-73. 
Lipson, Michael. “The Reincarnation of COCOM: Explaining Post-Cold War Export 
Controls.” The Nonproliferation Review (Winter 1999): 33, 34. 
Liu, Jianqiang. China’s Environmental Crisis Catalyzes New Democracy Movement. 
Worldwatch Institute, China Watch, June 19, 2007. 
http://www.worldwatch.org/node/5149 (accessed June 2007). 
Lockwood, David. The Destruction of the Soviet Union: A Study of Globalization, 
(Macmillan, Basingstoke, England 2000): 24-128. 
 80
Lohmar, Bryan, Jinxia Wang, Scott Rozelle, Jikun Huang, and David Dawe. China’s 
Agricultural Water Policy Reforms: Increasing Investment Resolving Conflicts, 
and Revising Incentives. 2003. Economic Research Service Agricultural 
Information Bulletin Number 782, (Washington, D.C.: United States Department 
of Agriculture): 3. 
Makovsky, David. “U.S. Worried about Sale of Israeli Technology to China.” Jerusalem 
Post (1996): 2; Tony Capaccio, “U.S., Israel Using ‘Low Key’ Process to Air 
Arms Retransfer concerns.” Defense Week (1995): 6. 
Martin, Brian. “Social Defense Strategy: The Role of Technology.” Journal of Peace 
Research 36:5 (1999): 537. 
Martin, Lisa L. Coercive Cooperation:  Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions, 
(Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1992). 
Mearsheimer, John J. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (W.W. Norton: New York, 
N.Y. 2001): 397-402; David Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia: Reshaping the 
Regional Order.” International Security (2004/2005): 99; Department of Defense, 
Quadrennial Defense Review Report (DOD: Washington, D.C. 2006): 28-30.  
Michelson, Evan S. “Nanotechnology Policy: An analysis of Transnational Governance 
Issues Facing the United States and China.” Woodrow Wilson International 
Center for Scholars (2006): 3-7. 
Military Embedded Systems. “General Micro Systems Introduces, Full Featured High 
Performance PC for Military Manpack Applications” (2006). http://www.mil-
embedded.com/news/db/?2873 (accessed January 2007).  
Montgomery, Evan Braden. “Breaking Out of the Security Dilemma: Realism, 
Reassurance, and the Problem of Uncertainty.” International Security 31:2 
(2006): 151-154; Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma.” 
World Politics 30:2 (1978): 167-214. 
Moravcsik, Andrew. “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International 
Politics.” International Organization 51:4 (1997): 516. 
Morrison, Wayne M. China’s Economic Condition, (CRS IB98014, 2006): 1. 
Nathan, Andrew J. and Robert S. Ross. Great Wall, Empty Fortress: China's Search for 
Security. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997). 
National Institute of Standards and Technology, Advanced Technology Program (ATP). 
http://www.atp.nist.gov/atp/charter.htm (accessed October 2007). 
National Nanotechnology Initiative. http://www.nano.gov/index.html (accessed October 
2007). 
 81
Naughton, Barry, and Adam Segal. “Technology Development in the New Millennium: 
China in Search of a Workable Model.” MIT Japan Program 1:3 (2001): 6, 7. 
NSTI website. http://www.nsti.org/about/relationships.html (accessed October 2007). 
Nye, Joseph S. Jr. Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: 
Public Affairs, 2004): x.  
Nye. Joseph S., Jr. and William A. Own. “America’s Information Edge.” Foreign Affairs 
75:2 (1996): 20. 
On Offensive Realism, see John J. Mearsheimer. “The False Promise of International 
Institutions.” International Security 19:3 (1994/95): 9-14; on defensive realism 
and the security dilemma, see Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security 
Dilemma.” World Politics 30:2 (1978): 167-214. 
Oneal, John R. and James L. Ray. “New Tests of Democratic Peace: Controlling For 
Economic Interdependence: 1950-1985.” Political Research Quarterly 50 (1997): 
751-75. 
Opall-Rome, Barbara. “China Leads Supercomputer Charge.” Defense News (1999): 8; 
Government Accountability Office. China: Military Imports from the United 
States and the European Union since the 1998 Embargoes. (GAO NSIAD-98-
176: Washington, D.C. June 1998): 2-4. 
Organization for Co-operation and Economic Development. China will become world’s 
second highest investor in R&D by end of 2006, finds OECD. 
http://www.oecd.org/document/26/0,2340,en_2649_201185_37770522_1_1_1_1,
00.htm (accessed December 2006). 
Paarlberg, Robert L. “Knowledge as Power: Science, Military Dominance, and U.S. 
Security.” International Security 29:1 (Summer 2004): 122-151, 137. 
Pape, Robert A. “Soft Balancing against the United States.” International Security 30:1 
(2005): 7-9. 
Pape, Robert A. “Soft Balancing: How the World Will Respond to U.S. Preventive War 
on Iraq.” article posted on the Oak Park Coalition for Truth and Justice Website. 
http://www.opctj.org/articles/robert-a-pape-university-of-chicago-02-21-2003-
004443.html (accessed August 2006). 
Parkhe, Arvind. “U.S. National Security Export Controls: Implications for Global 
Competitiveness of U.S. High-Tech Firms.” Strategic Management Journal, 13:1. 
(January 1992): 47-66. 
 82
Pollard, Patricia S. “National Economic Trends: U.S. Production Abroad.” Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis (2004). 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/net/20040601/cover.pdf (accessed 
October 2007). 
Preble, Christopher. “Two Normal Countries: Rethinking the U.S.-Japan Strategic 
Relationship.” Policy Analysis 566 (2006): 13. 
RAND. Building a Multinational Global Navigation Satellite System: An Initial Look, 
Project Air Force, 2005, 2, 3, 66. 
RAND. Going Global?: U.S. Government Policy and the Defense Aerospace Industry, 
Project Air Force, 2002, Summary XXII. 
RAND. United States Air and Space Power in the 21st Century, Project Air Force, 
Washington, D.C., (2002): 152. 
Ratchford, J. Thomas. “Put Science and Technology Back into Foreign Policy.” Science 
282:5394 (1998): 1650. 
Roden, Mark. “US-China Relations in the Contemporary Era: An International Political 
Economy Perspective.” Politics 23:3 (2003): 197. 
Russett, Bruce and John Oneal. Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and 
International Organizations (New York: W.W. Norton 2001). 
Schmeter, Uli. “What’s the Motorola Chip Doing in Land Mine?” Chicago Tribune 
(1994); Kenneth R. Timmerman, “Close-Out Sale at Commerce.” American 
Spectator (1995), 40. 
Segal, Adam. “Practical Engagement: Drawing a Fine Line for U.S. – China Trade.” The 
Washington Quarterly 27:3 (2004): 157-158, 161. 
Segal, Gerald. “The Coming Confrontation between China and Japan.” World Policy 
Journal 10:2 (1993): 27-32. 
Segal, Gerald. “Tying China to the International System.” Survival 37:2 (1995):60-73. 
Shambaugh, David. “China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order.” International 
Security (2004/05): 64-78; Joshua Kurlantzick, “China’s Charm: Implications of 
Chinese Soft Power.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace no. 47 
(2006).  
Skolnikoff, Eugene B. The Elusive Transformation: Science and Technology, and the 
Evolution of International Politics. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New 
Jersey, 1993, 210. 
 83
Sun.com. Sun and China Standard Software Company partner to establish the Java 
desktop system as the foundation for China’s fast growing IT industry (2003). 
http://sun.com/smi/press/sunflash/2003-11/sunflash.20031117.3.xml (accessed 
August 2007). 
Tkacik, John J. Jr. “Panda Hedging: Pentagon Report Urges New Strategy for China.” 
The Heritage Foundation No. 1093 (2006):1. 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. “Nanotechnology White Paper.” Science Policy 
Council U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, External Review Draft (2005): 9. 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. EPA Newsroom, U.S. EPA, SEPA and Asian 
Development Bank Collaborate on Environmental Protection (2006). 
http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/0/00F8F56235A56C7685257245004FD
2BF (accessed October 2007). 
Underhill, Geoffrey R. D. “State, Market, and Global Political Economy: Genealogy of 
an (Inter-?) Discipline.” International Affairs (Royal Institute of International 
Affairs 1944-) 76:4 (2000): 805-807. 
Van Atta, Richard. “Export Controls and the U.S. Defense Industrial Base.” Institute for 
Defense Analysis Volume 2 (2007): A-3. 
Wall Street Journal online. China’s Launch Services Makes Inroads, Irks US. 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119154666486349753.html?mod=DAR (accessed 
October 2007). 
Walt, Stephen M. “Keeping the World ‘Off-Balance’: Self-Restraint and U.S. Foreign 
Policy.” in G. John Ikenberry’s, America Unrivaled, (Cornell University Press, 
New York 2002): 153. 
Walt, Stephen M. The Origin of Alliances (Itica, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990); 
Charles Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 1929-1939 (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1973). 
Wendt, Alexander. “Anarchy Is What States Make It: The Social Construction of Power 
Politics.” International Organization, 46:2 (1992): 391-425. 
Wirth, Timothy E., Irving A. Lerch, and Peter A. Cohen. “Science, Technology, and 
Foreign Policy.” Science 277:5330 (1997): 277, 278. 
Wo-Laplam, Willy. “Jiang Boosts Defense Funding.” South China Morning Post, 
December 1, 1999. 
Wong, John. “China's Outward Direct Investment: Expanding Worldwide.” China: An 
International Journal 4: 2 (2003): 273-301. 
 84
Zhou, Ping and Loet Leydesdorff. “The Emergence of China as a Leading Nation of 
Science.” Research Policy (forthcoming): 30. 
Zissis, Carin. China’s Anti-Satellite Test, Council on Foreign Relations: A Resource for 
Nonpartisan Information and Analysis (2007). 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/12684/ (accessed August 2007). 
 85
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 86
 87
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia  
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
